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Do Fish Resist?1 
DINESH JOSEPH WADIWEL 
UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY 
In	  2010	   the	  UK-­‐based	  organisation,	   Fishcount.org.uk,	   released	  a	  pioneering	   report	  which	  attempted	  to	  estimate	  the	  number	  of	  wild	  sea	  animals	  killed	  each	  year	  as	  part	  of	   commercial	   fishing.	   Data	   has	   been	   available	   from	   national	   and	   international	  organisations	   on	   commercial	   fishing	   quantities;	   however,	   most	   of	   these	   previous	  measures,	   such	  as	   those	  maintained	  by	   the	  UN	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organisation,	  refer	   to	  sea	  animals	  produced	   for	   food	  by	  weight	  rather	   than	  number,	   thus	  veiling	  from	   public	   perception	   the	   actual	   number	   of	   sea	   animals	   which	   are	   used	   by	  humans.2	   Based	   on	   their	   own	   research,	   Fishcount.org.uk	   and	   the	   report’s	   lead	  author,	  Alison	  Mood,	  proposed	  a	  sobering	  statistic:	  that	  between	  0.97	  and	  2.7	  trillion	  wild	   fish	   are	   slaughtered	   every	   year	   through	   commercial	   fishing.3	   In	   a	   follow	   up	  report,	  Mood	  and	  Phil	  Brooke	  attempted	  to	  also	  estimate	  the	  number	  of	   fish	  killed	  annually	  through	  fish	  farming	  (or	  aquaculture):	  their	  estimate	  in	  2012	  was	  that	  this	  was	  of	  the	  order	  of	  37	  to	  120	  billion	  per	  year.4	  (To	  put	  these	  figures	  in	  perspective,	  the	   UN	   Food	   and	   Agriculture	   Organisation	   data	   indicates	   that	   in	   2010,	   63	   billion	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land	  animals	  were	  slaughtered	  for	  human	  consumption,	  a	  figure	  that	  is	   likely	  to	  be	  close	   to	   70	   billion	   for	   the	   year	   just	   past.)5	   These	   figures	   do	   not	   include	   the	  potentially	   large	   numbers	   of	   fish	   caught	   globally	   through	   recreational	   fishing	  practices.6	  We	  know	  that	  the	  global	  use	  of	  sea	  animals	  for	  food	  is	  set	  to	  increase.	  World	  per	  capita	   fish	   consumption	   has	  more	   or	   less	   doubled	   in	   the	   last	   fifty	   years	   (from	  9.9	  kilgrams	  to19.2	  kilograms	  per	  person	  per	  year),	  meaning	  that	  not	  only	  are	  more	  fish	  being	   killed	   to	   feed	   a	   larger	   human	   population	   across	   the	   globe,	   but	   on	   average	  humans	   are	   eating	   more	   fish	   per	   person	   than	   ever	   before.7	   Concern	   around	  industrial	  wild	   fish	   capture,	   particularly	   the	   effects	   of	   this	   exponential	   increase	   in	  human	  utilisation,	  has	  also	  been	  the	   focus	  of	  environmental	  concern.	  The	  UN	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organisation	  claims	   that	   in	  2011	  some	   ‘28.8	  percent	  of	   fish	  stocks	  were	   estimated	   as	   fished	   at	   a	   biologically	   unsustainable	   level’.8	   It	   is	   little	  wonder	  that	  Nobel	  Prize	  winner	  Paul	  Crutzen,	  in	  proposing	  the	  geological	  time	  period	  of	  the	  ‘Anthropocene’,	  singled	  out	  mechanised	  fishing	  as	  one	  example	  of	  a	  significant	  area	  of	  planetary	  scale	  human	  impact.	  Crutzen	  noted	  in	  2002	  that	  ‘fisheries	  remove	  more	  than	   25%	   of	   the	   primary	   production	   in	   upwelling	   ocean	   regions	   and	   35%	   in	   the	  temperate	   continental	   shelf’.9	   Human	   wild	   fish	   capture	   certainly	   accounts	   for	   the	  largest	   proportion	   of	   all	   fish	   caught	   globally;	   however,	   industrialised	   fishing	   is	  shifting	  from	  the	  use	  of	  mechanised	  predation	  towards	  intensive	  fish	  farming	  in	  the	  context	   of	   aquaculture.	   Following	   an	   explosion	   in	   the	  use	  of	   aquaculture	   since	   the	  1990s	  (at	  a	  growth	  rate	  of	  around	  9.5	  per	  cent	  per	  year),	   farmed	  fish	  now	  account	  for	  a	  sizeable	  proportion	  of	  all	  fish	  killed	  for	  human	  use,	  standing	  at	  around	  42	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  fish	  slaughtered.10	  Today	  fish	  farming	  has	  overtaken	  beef	  farming	  globally	  as	   a	   source	   of	   animal	   protein.11	   Aquaculture—factory	   farms	   for	   fish—looks	   to	   be	  positioned	  as	  an	  essential	  element	  within	  global	  food	  supply.	  The	   welfare	   picture	   in	   the	   context	   of	   industrialised	   fishing	   is	   frightening.12	  Despite	  the	  huge	  scale	  of	  the	  industry,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  significant	  welfare	  precautions	  are	  taken	  in	  fishing	  practices	  to	  reduce	  the	  suffering	  fish	  experience	  as	  part	   of	   their	   use	   by	   humans.	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   publicly	   documented	  welfare	  concerns	  surrounding	  recreational	  and	  industrial	  fishing	  practices,	  including	  around	  line	  fishing,	  net	  fishing	  and	  the	  trauma	  associated	  with	  the	  capture	  and	  transport	  of	  live	  fish.13	  However,	  arguably,	  the	  mode	  of	  slaughter	  used	  to	  kill	  fish	  in	  most	  fishing	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industry	  practices	  offers	  us	  the	  most	  telling	  insight	  into	  the	  poverty	  of	  current	  basic	  welfare	   protections	   available	   to	   fish	   that	   are	   used	   by	   humans.	   By	   far	   the	   most	  prevalent	  means	  of	  slaughter	  by	  the	  fishing	  industry	  is	  death	  by	  asphyxiation,	  where	  fish	  are	  left	  in	  the	  open	  air	  to	  die	  slowly	  as	  their	  bodies	  are	  deprived	  of	  oxygen.	  Fish	  usually	  take	  a	  long	  time	  to	  die	  this	  way,	  and	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  period	  until	  stunning—that	  is,	  the	  period	  during	  which	  fish	  suffer	  before	  they	  are	  unconscious—is	  considerable.	  Rainbow	  trout	   take	  some	   fifteen	  minutes	  before	   they	  are	  stunned;	  sea	  bream	  twenty-­‐five	  minutes	  and	  sea	  bass	  sixty	  minutes.14	  The	  prevalent	  practice	  of	  placing	  live	  fish	  on	  an	  ice	  slurry	  is	  no	  better;	  indeed	  is	  likely	  to	  further	  prolong	  the	  time	  before	  fish	  are	  effectively	  stunned.	  Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  trout	  take	  between	  twenty-­‐eight	   and	   198	   minutes	   to	   be	   stunned	   using	   this	   method;	   salmon	   sixty	  minutes,	   and	   sea	   bream	   twenty	   to	   forty	   minutes.15	   Many	   fish	   are	   subject	   to	   live	  gutting	  as	  part	  of	  the	  slaughter	  process.	  Some	  fish	  continue	  to	  live	  during	  and	  after	  being	  gutted;	  one	  study	  indicates	  that	  stunning	  times	  vary	  between	  twenty-­‐five	  and	  sixty	  minutes	  for	  gutted	  fish.16	  The	  use	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  to	  stun	  fish	  may	  speed	  up	  stunning	   periods.	   But	   this	  may	   also	   lead	   to	   a	   ‘quick	   and	   violent	   reaction,	   such	   as	  repeated	  swimming	  around,	  attempts	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  tub	  and	  abnormal	  activity	  before	  stunning’.17	  In	  some	  cases,	  sea	  animals	  may	  take	  a	  relatively	  long	  time	  to	  be	  stunned	   using	   carbon	   dioxide;	   for	   example	   109	   minutes	   for	   eels.18	   Many	   fish	   are	  
indirectly	  killed	  or	  injured	  by	  nets,	  hooks	  or	  other	  fish	  before	  they	  land	  on	  board	  a	  ship	   (something	   I	   discuss	   below).	   However,	   many	   forms	   of	   suffering	   are	   directly,	  intentionally,	   imposed	   on	   fish	   as	   part	   of	   the	   killing	   process,	   often	   as	   a	   means	   to	  produce	   a	   desired	   marketable	   commodity	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   process	   (that	   is,	   fish	  meat).	  One	  example	   is	   cutting	   fish	   across	   the	  gills	   and	   returning	   them	  alive	   to	   the	  water.	  This	  uses	  the	  beating	  heart	  of	  the	  fish	  while	  it	  is	  still	  alive	  to	  flush	  blood	  from	  its	  body,	  supposedly	  to	  produce	  a	  desirable	  effect	  on	  fish	  meat	  in	  terms	  of	  taste	  and	  appearance.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  eels,	   it	   is	   common	  practice	   to	  place	   them	   in	  a	   saltwater	  bath	   to	   ‘deslime	   them’—a	   process	   to	   which	   eels	   are	   aversive—before	   being	  eviscerated	  alive.	  The	  whole	  ordeal	  takes	  some	  twenty	  minutes.19	  These	  visceral	  horrors	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  fishing	  and	  fishing	  industries,	  but	  the	   advocacy	   challenge	   for	   pro-­‐animal	   activists,	   scholars	   and	   workers	   remains	  daunting.	  While	   legal	  protections	   are	  offered	   to	  many	   land	  animals	   routinely	  used	  for	  food,	  the	  same	  protections	  are	  not	  available	  for	  fish.20	  In	  part,	  this	  situation	  is	  a	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result	  of	  a	   lack	  of	  agreement	   that	   fish	  are	  capable	  of	   suffering,	  or	  at	   least	   that	   this	  suffering	   matters.	   There	   is	   some	   recognition	   that	   land	   animals	   used	   for	   food,	  experiments	  and	  recreation	  can	  suffer	  at	  human	  hands,	  and	  this	  shapes	  welfare	  laws	  and	   regulation	   aimed	   at	   minimising	   this	   suffering.21	   This	   in	   turn	   shapes	   the	  advocacy	   arguments	   made	   by	   animal	   advocates	   on	   behalf	   of	   land	   animals,	   which	  usually	  involve	  balancing	  animal	  suffering	  against	  human	  utility.22	  In	  the	  case	  of	  fish,	  there	  is	  no	  universal	  acceptance	  that	  fish	  suffer,	  which	  in	  turn	  shapes	  the	  advocacy	  task.	   Advocates	   are	   forced	   to	   argue	   first	   that	   fish	   do	   indeed	   suffer	   (since	   this	   is	  contentious),	   and	   then,	   subsequently,	   argue	   for	  minimal	   (and	   often	   very	  minimal)	  welfare	  measures	  to	  be	  adopted	  to	  mitigate	  the	  intense	  volume	  of	  this	  suffering.23	  	  This	   situation—where	   advocates	   must	   argue	   that	   fish	   feel	   pain	   since	   this	  knowledge	   is	   not	   taken	   for	   granted—is	   at	   least	   in	   part	   a	   result	   of	   the	   uncertain	  science	  on	   fish	  suffering.	  There	  are	  many	  scientific	   studies	  which	  have	  shown	  that	  some	  fish	  do	  feel	  pain	  and	  that	  this	  has	  significant	  welfare	  implications.	  In	  2003,	  for	  example,	   Lynne	   Sneddon	   and	   her	   colleagues	   performed	   experiments	   on	   rainbow	  trout.	  They	  observed	  aversive	  behaviours	  to	  potentially	  painful	  experiences	  and	  also	  observed	  that	  administering	  morphine	  to	  the	  fish	  significantly	  reduced	  pain-­‐related	  behaviours.24	   These	   studies,	   and	   the	   problems	   they	   raise,	   were	   further	   expanded	  upon	  by	  one	  of	  Sneddon’s	  co-­‐researchers,	  Victoria	  Braithwaite,	  in	  her	  2010	  book	  Do	  
Fish	   Feel	   Pain?25	   Against	   this	   view,	   other	   scientists	   have	   consistently	   argued,	  perhaps	  as	  an	  echo	  of	  the	  view	  that	  is	  attributed	  to	  Descrates’	  that	  animals	  are	  mere	  automata	   (bête-­‐machine),	   that	   fish	   do	   not	   experience	   suffering,	   only	   reaction	   to	  stimuli.26	  Notably	   James	  D.	   Rose	   and	  his	   fellow	   researchers	   in	   2012	   contested	   the	  view	  that	  fish	  could	  experience	  pain	  in	  the	  way	  humans	  do.	  The	  researchers	  argued:	  even	   if	   fishes	   were	   conscious,	   it	   is	   unwarranted	   to	   assume	   that	   they	  possess	   a	   human-­‐like	   capacity	   for	   pain.	   Overall,	   the	   behavioural	   and	  neurobiological	   evidence	   reviewed	   shows	   fish	   responses	   to	   nociceptive	  stimuli	  are	  limited	  and	  fishes	  are	  unlikely	  to	  experience	  pain.27	  	  The	   uncertainty	   within	   the	   scientific	   community	   over	   whether	   fish	   feel	   pain,	  combined	  with	  a	  public	  attachment	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  existing	  fishing	  practices,	  produces	   a	   somewhat	   perverse	   silence	   in	   relation	   to	   fish	   welfare.	   The	   lack	   of	  consistent	  agreement	  on	  the	  question	  of	  fish	  suffering	  leads	  to	  inaction.	  It	  limits	  the	  capacity	  of	  policy	  makers	  to	  take	  decisive	  steps	  towards	  mitigating	  fish	  suffering.	  As	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Celeste	  Black	  puts	  it:	  ‘the	  absence	  of	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  basic	  issue	  of	  fish	  suffering	  may	  be	  used	  as	  grounds	  to	  exclude	  fish	  from	  the	  reach	  of	  animal	  welfare	  laws’.28	  For	  animal	  advocates,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  now	  a	  tactical	  quandary	  over	  how	  we	  might	   respond	   to	   the	   massive	   human	   violence	   directed	   against	   fish.	   We	   know	  already	   that	   the	   global	   expansion	   of	   human	   utilisation	   of	   land	   animals	   for	   food	  represents	   an	   extraordinary	   ethical	   and	   political	   challenge.	   The	   reality	   of	   growing	  human	   use	   of	   animals,	   the	   expansion	   of	   industrialised	   reproduction,	   containment	  and	   slaughter,	   combined	   with	   limited	   will	   from	   decision	   makers—indeed	   most	  humans—to	  mitigate	   their	  use	  of	   animals,	  means	  prospects	  of	   change	   in	   favour	  of	  land	  animals	  remains	  slim.	  As	  Sue	  Donaldson	  and	  Will	  Kymlicka	  have	  frankly	  noted:	  ‘for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  we	  can	  expect	  more	  and	  more	  animals	  every	  year	  to	  be	  bred,	   confined,	   tortured,	   exploited,	   and	   killed	   to	   satisfy	   human	   desires’.29	   For	   sea	  animals	  the	  situation	  looks	  even	  more	  grim:	  the	  growing	  world	  per	  capita	  appetite	  for	   fish,	   the	   exponential	   expansion	   of	   industrial	   aquaculture,	   and	   limited	   public	  agreement	   on	   the	   question	   of	   fish	   suffering,	   all	   suggest	   that	   fish	   welfare	   will	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  low	  priority	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  massive	  restructuring	  of	  global	  human	  consumption	  towards	  fish-­‐based	  protein.	  It	   is	  with	   this	   in	  mind	   that	   in	   this	   article	   I	   now	   abandon	   the	   question	   of	   fish	  suffering—at	  least	  directly—and	  focus	  instead	  on	  understanding	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  question	   ‘do	  fish	  resist?’	  My	  interest	   in	  resistance	  is	  that	  it	  offers	  a	  different	  model	  for	   considering	   political	   agency.	   If	   we	   award	  moral	   recognition	   to	   animals	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  their	  sentience,	  then	  we	  argue	  that	  moral	  worth	  depends	  upon	  some	  innate	  capacity	   related	   to	  sentience	   (for	  example	   the	  ability	   to	   feel	  pain,	  or	   to	  experience	  emotions).	   Classic	   pro-­‐animal	   approaches	   have	   tried	   to	   demonstrate	   innate	  capability	   in	   order	   to	   ‘ground’	   a	   claim	   for	   moral	   recognition.	   For	   example	   Peter	  Singer’s	  foundational	  text,	  Animal	  Liberation,	  uses	  a	  utilitarian	  approach	  to	  suffering	  as	   a	  basis	   to	  weigh	   the	  moral	   claims	  of	   animals;	  Tom	  Regan’s	  The	  Case	   for	  Animal	  
Rights	   instead	  argues	   that	  animals,	   in	  so	   far	  as	   they	  are	   ‘subjects	  of	  a	   life’,	  have	  an	  intrinsic	  moral	  worth;	   and	  Martha	  Nussbaum	   applies	   the	   capabilities	   approach	   to	  animals	   to	   argue	   that	   animals	   have	   their	   own	   needs	   for	   flourishing	   that	  we	  must	  recognise.30	  Against	  these	  approaches,	  my	  interest	  in	  resistance	  is	  that	  it	  describes	  a	  form	  of	  political	  agency	  that	  need	  not	  be	  grounded	  in	  an	  innate	  capability	  or	  worth.	  If	   we	   think	   about	   resistance—for	   example,	   human	   political	  mobilisation	   against	   a	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totalitarian	   dictator—we	   are	   not	   initially	   concerned	   with	   recognising	   the	   moral	  worth	   of	   those	  who	   resist;	  we	   are	   instead	   interested	   in	   how	   those	  who	   resist	   are	  involved	  in	  relationships	  of	  power.	  This	  understanding	  of	  resistance	  draws	  explicitly	  from	  the	  tradition	  established	  by	  Foucault	  in	  understanding	  resistance	  as	  always	  in	  relation	  to	  power	  (although,	  as	  I	  discuss	  in	  this	  article,	  there	  is	  scope	  to	  build	  further	  on	   this	   understanding);	   power	   describes	   the	   existence	   of	   contestation.31	   For	  Foucault	  power	  involves:	  	  mobile	  and	  transitory	  points	  of	  resistance,	  producing	  cleavages	  in	  a	  society	  that	   shift	   about,	   fracturing	   unities	   and	   effecting	   regroupings,	   furrowing	  across	   individuals	   themselves,	   cutting	   them	   up	   and	   remoulding	   them,	  marking	  off	  irreducible	  regions	  in	  them,	  in	  their	  bodies	  and	  minds.32	  Foucault’s	   view	   of	   power	   as	   a	   frictional	   tussle	   of	   forces	   allows	   resistive	   elements	  within	  relations	  of	  power	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  engaging	  ‘agentially’	  within	  relations	  of	  power	  without	  having	  to	  demonstrate	  that	   those	  who	  resist	  possess	  capabilities	  worthy	  of	  moral	  recognition	  (language,	  reason,	  capability	  for	  suffering	  and	  so	  on).33	  Keeping	  the	  dynamics	  of	  power	  in	  the	  frame,	  in	  some	  respects	  it	  is	  simply	  enough	  to	  understand	  that	  if	  there	  is	  power,	  there	  must	  be	  resistance.	  Focusing	  on	  relations	  of	  power	   and	   their	   resistance	   also	   allows	   us	   to	   ask	   whether	   these	   relationships	   of	  power	  are	  ‘just’	  relations,	  particularly	  where	  these	  relations	  are	  violent.	  Thus,	  when	  we	  think	  about	  political	  resistance	  to	  authority,	  we	  frequently	  ask	  if	  the	  resistance	  is	  justified,	   and	   how	   those	   who	   protest	   are	   responding	   with	   respect	   to	   power.	  Thinking	  about	  resistance	  opens	  question	  of	  social	  justice,	  perhaps	  without	  needing	  to	  think	  about	  whether	  those	  who	  resist	  have	  an	  innate	  individual	  capacity	  that	  we	  must	  ethically	  recognise	  (such	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  suffer).	  My	   aim	   in	   this	   article	   is	   to	   explore	   whether	   conceptualising	   fish	   resistance	  offers	   some	   opportunities	   to	   reframe	   human	   violence	   towards	   sea	   animals,	   and	  whether	   it	   offers	   different	   tools	   for	   advocacy.	   I	   use	   the	   term	   ‘fish’	   extraordinarily	  loosely	  here	  to	  describe	  ‘sea	  animals’.	  Others	  have	  elsewhere	  discussed	  the	  technical	  difficulties	   in	   deciding	   between	   categories	   of	   sea	   animals—aquatic	   mammals,	  vertebrates	   and	   aquatic	   invertebrate—and	   whether	   these	   different	   animals	   are	  owed	   differential	   welfare	   consideration.34	   In	   keeping	   with	   my	   broad	   conceptual	  questions,	   I	  will	   suspend	  discussion	  of	   taxonomic	  classification	  of	  sea	  animals,	  and	  whether	   these	   variations	   suggest	   differences	   in	   how	   we	   might	   understand	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resistance.	   But	   my	   primary	   focus	   is	   on	   fish	   that	   are	   the	   object	   of	   industrialised	  fishing.	   I	   do	   not	   draw	   from	   observational	   studies	   of	   fish	   to	   ‘prove’	   that	   fish	   resist	  through	   observed	   normatively	   defined	   behaviours.	   As	   I	   discuss	   in	   the	   following	  section,	   part	   of	   my	   challenge	   is	   to	   tackle	   fish	   resistance	   as	   an	   ‘epistemological	  problem’;	  that	  is,	  a	  problem	  of	  how	  we	  frame	  human	  knowledge	  of	  fish,	  and	  how	  this	  shapes	  what	  we	  can	  know	  and	  think	   is	  possible.	   In	   the	  second	  part	  of	   the	  article,	   I	  examine	  existing	  discussions	  of	  resistance	  within	  animal	  studies.	  I	  look	  particularly	  at	  the	  ‘autonomous’	  model	  of	  resistance	  as	  one	  that	  is	  promising	  for	  understanding	  fish.	  Finally,	  I	  apply	  this	  autonomous	  model	  of	  resistance	  to	  examining	  three	  fishing	  technologies:	  the	  hook,	  purse	  seine,	  and	  aquaculture.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  technologies,	  their	  existence,	  have	  been	  formed	  against	  the	  creative	  resistance	  of	  fish,	  highlighting	  that	   fish	   do	   resist	   and	   opening	   a	   different	   way	   to	   conceptualise	   the	   resistance	   of	  animals.	  
—EPISTEMOLOGIES OF FISH RESISTANCE: ‘THE FISH ACTUALLY WANTED TO DIE’ In	  order	  to	  understand	  fish	  resistance,	   it	  seems	  worth	  attending	  to	   the	  question	  of	  ‘epistemology’	  and	  then,	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘epistemic	  violence’.35	   In	  some	  respects	  the	  question	   ‘do	   fish	   resist?’	   can	   only	   be	   answered	   by	   deliberating	   on	   the	   question	   of	  epistemologies;	  of	  what	  we	  ‘know’	  and	  how	  what	  we	  ‘know’	  frames	  what	  is	  possible.	  I	  will	   treat	   ‘epistemology’	  here	   as	   suggesting	  a	   system	  of	   knowledge	  or	   truth:	   it	   is	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  system	  of	  truth	  that	  we	  may	  verify	  whether	  statements	  may	  be	   true	   or	   false,	   and	   a	   system	   of	   truth	   renders	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   see	   and	  understand	  the	  world.	  One	  example	  of	  an	  epistemology	  is	  the	  system	  of	  knowledge	  that	   has	   been	   built	   around	   the	   scientific	   method,	   which	   has	   relied	   upon	   making	  systematic	  and	  repeated	  observations	  of	  the	  world	  and	  phenomena,	  and	  based	  upon	  these	   observations	   has	   theorised	   what	  might	   be	   true.	   A	   related	   consideration	   for	  epistemology	  is	  the	  way	  we	  frame	  a	  particular	  issue,	  how	  this	  frame	  simultaneously	  situates	  actors,	  and	  how	  this	  frame	  enables	  what	  is	  possible	  and	  impossible	  within	  any	  given	  context.	  	  This	  understanding	  of	  epistemology,	  which	  gives	  preference	   to	  understanding	  the	  contours,	  dynamics	  and	  effects	  of	  what	  we	  know	  as	  true,	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  verify	  what	   is	   in	   itself	   ‘true’,	   is	   shaped	  by	  an	  explicitly	  Foucauldian	  outlook,	  which	  comprehends	   epistemology	   as	   constituted	   by	   contesting	   social	   and	   political	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processes.36	   Foucault’s	   method	   provides	   a	   way	   to	   understand	   and	   reframe	   the	  ‘scientific’	  method	   of	   progressively	   completing	   the	   documentation	   of	   what	   is	   true	  through	   empirical	   observation	   (for	   example,	   through	   experimentation	   to	  conclusively	   determine	   if	   fish	   feel	   pain),	   by	   allowing	   us	   to	   instead	   understand	  knowledge	  as	  determining	  what	  is	  possible,	  including	  what	  is	  possible	  to	  think:	  I	   am	  not	   concerned	   ...	   to	  describe	   the	  progress	  of	   knowledge	   towards	  an	  objectivity	   in	  which	   today’s	   science	   can	   finally	   be	   recognized;	  what	   I	   am	  trying	   to	  bring	   to	   light	   is	   the	  epistemological	   field,	   the	  episteme	   in	  which	  knowledge,	   envisaged	   apart	   from	   all	   criteria	   having	   reference	   to	   its	  rational	  value	  or	  to	  its	  objective	  forms,	  grounds	  its	  positivity	  and	  thereby	  manifests	  a	  history	  which	  is	  not	  that	  of	   its	  growing	  perfection,	  but	  rather	  that	  of	  its	  conditions	  of	  possibility.37	  Here	  the	  focus	  of	  Foucault’s	  approach	  is	  not	  to	  evaluate	  knowledge,	  or	  the	  history	  of	  knowledge,	  by	  understanding	   its	  potential	   ‘proximity’	   to	  an	  objective	   truth.	  On	   the	  contrary,	   of	   more	   interest	   to	   Foucault	   is	   understanding	   how	   a	   regime	   of	   truth	  conditions	  possibility,	  and	  in	  turn	  how	  this	  inflects	  relations	  of	  power.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  incredibly	  useful	  for	  unpacking	  human	  relations	  of	  power	  with	  fish.	  As	  I	  have	  discussed	  above,	  one	  of	   the	  tensions	  when	  considering	  whether	  fish	  that	   are	  utilised	  by	  humans	  are	  owed	  welfare	   is	   the	   current	   scientific	  debate	  over	  whether	  fish	  suffer.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  epistemological	  framing	  here.	  The	  fact	  that	  fish	  suffering	  is	  in	  question,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  need	  scientists	  to	  answer	  this	  question	   before	   we—humans—decide	   to	   take	   action,	   demonstrates	   a	   problem	   of	  framing,	  where	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   imagine	  offering	  welfare	   to	   fish—or	   indeed	  stop	  fishing—until	  verification	  arrives	  that	  fish	  do	  indeed	  suffer.	  	  Perhaps	   of	   more	   concern	   is	   that	   this	   framing	   creates	   apparently	   rational	  positions,	   which	   are	   in	   some	   respects	   easily	   rendered	   as	   irrational,	   and	   certainly	  unjustifiable,	   at	   least	   when	   examined	   using	   a	   different	   perspective	   on	   ‘truth’.	   At	  present	  humans	  kill	  trillions	  of	  fish;	  many	  of	  these	  fish	  are	  hunted	  and	  slaughtered	  (or	   bred,	   intensively	   contained	   and	   slaughtered)	   with	   minimal	   (or	   no)	   welfare	  precautions	  taken.	  Humans	  apparently	  feel	  able	  to	  continue	  their	  practices	  because	  no	   science	   has	   consistently	   verified	   whether	   fish	   suffer.	   There	   is	   insufficient	  evidence	   to	   support	   change,	   and	   change	   is	   costly.38	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	   could	  equally	   argue	   that	  we	   should	  not	   use	   fish	  until	  we	   are	   clear	   on	   the	   science	  of	   fish	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suffering.	  Given	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  potential	  suffering	  that	  we	  may	  impose	  on	  trillions	  of	  fish	  through	  our	  use	  of	  them,	  the	  ‘rational	  position’	  could	  easily	  be	  that	  we	  should	  not	  harm	  fish,	  or	  alternatively	  offer	  maximal	  welfare	  to	  fish,	  until	  such	  a	  time	  comes	  when	  we	  have	  confirmed	  evidence,	  one	  way	  or	  other,	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	   fish	   suffer.	   Certainly	   some	   of	   the	  minimal	   welfare	   precautions	   that	   have	  been	   adopted	   with	   respect	   to	   fish	   have	   occurred	   through	   this	   kind	   of	   cautious	  ‘benefit	   of	   the	   doubt’	   approach,	   but	   these	   same	   precautious	   have	   been	   strongly	  criticised,	  precisely	  because,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  fish	  suffering	  has	  been	  framed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  assumes	  we	  can	  continue	  using	  fish	  the	  way	  we	  do	  until	  somebody	  proves	  that	  we	  should	  not.39	  I	   do	   not	   raise	   all	   of	   this	   to	   call	   into	   question	   the	   scientific	   method	   and	   its	  capacity	  to	  answer	  the	  pressing	  question:	  ‘Do	  fish	  feel	  pain?’	  I	  raise	  it	  rather	  to	  stress	  that	   the	   epistemology	   of	   fish	   suffering	   is	   shaped	   by	   a	   vast	   human	   investment—monetary,	  infrastructural,	  dietary,	  institutional—in	  precisely	  making	  fish	  suffer,	  and	  this	  has	   in	   turn	  shaped	   the	  high	  stakes	  of	  how	  we	  see	   fish	  and	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  question	  ‘do	  fish	  feel	  pain?’	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  utilise	  fish	  on	  a	  monstrous	  scale,	  and	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  suffer	  if	  they	  have	  a	  capacity	  to	  suffer,	  and	  that	  we	  do	  so	  without	  reliable	  science	  to	  confirm	  that	  fish	  do	  not	  suffer	  at	  our	  hands,	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  relationship	  of	  our	  system	  of	  truth	  to	  power,	  and	  the	  way	  this	  frames	   problems	   and	   determines	   subject	   positions.	   Instead	   of	   asking	   ‘do	   fish	   feel	  pain?,’	  a	  different	  order	  of	  question	  might	  be:	   ‘How	  can	  we	  use	  fish	  the	  way	  we	  do,	  on	  the	  scale	  we	  do,	  when	  we	  are	  still	  not	  certain	  that	  they	  do	  not	  suffer?’40	  Fish	  and	  fishing	  remind	  us	  that	  violence	  itself	  is	  shaped	  by	  our	  systems	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  as	  such	  many	  of	  these	  questions	  are	  essentially	  epistemic	  in	  nature.	  Violence,	  as	  it	  is	  rendered	  within	  the	  public	  space	  and	  by	  the	  politics	  of	  suffering,	  can	  only	  be	  made	  visible	  within	   the	  context	  of	  available	  knowledge	  systems.41	   It	   is	  only	  possible	   to	   see	   violence	   towards	   animals	   when	   we	   conceptualise	   this	   as	  possible.42	  The	  relative	  silence	  around	  the	   fishing	  practices,	   the	   large	  global	  and	   industrial	   scale	   of	   this	   endeavour	   and	   the	   reliance	   on	   the	   scientific	  project	   to	   verify	   fish	   suffering,	   all	   perhaps	   indicate	   that	   we	   fundamentally	  lack	   the	   knowledge	   systems	   to	   imagine	   fish	   as	   subjects	   of	   violence,	   or	  understand	  fishing	  as	  a	  system	  of	  concentrated	  violence	  against	  sea	  animals.	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In	  a	  well	  known	  essay	  called	  ‘Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?,’	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak	   describes	   what	   she	   calls	   ‘epistemic	   violence’	   as	   a	   way	   to	   understand	   the	  capacity	   of	   systems	   of	   truth	   to	   silence	   particular	   subjects,	   and	   render	   visible	   and	  invisible	  particular	   forms	  of	   truth	  and	  possibility.43	   Spivak	  offers	   the	  case	   study	  of	  ritual	  widow	  burning	  in	  India,	  sati,	   the	  practice	  that	  was	  subject	  to	  legal	  regulation	  by	   the	   British	   as	   part	   of	   their	   colonising	   mission	   in	   India,	   and	   then	   subject	   to	  response	   from	   Indian	   traditionalists	   claiming	   the	   practice	   as	   a	   ‘custom’.44	   Spivak	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  system	  of	  truth	  shaped	  the	  narratives	  of	  these	  two	  voices	  of	  the	  coloniser	  and	  the	  colonised,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  silence	  the	  voices	  of	  Indian	  women:	  	  The	  Hindu	  widow	   ascends	   the	   pyre	   of	   the	   dead	   husband	   and	   immolates	  herself	  upon	  it.	  This	  is	  widow	  sacrifice.	  (The	  conventional	  transcription	  of	  the	  Sanskrit	  word	  for	  the	  widow	  would	  be	  sati.	  The	  early	  colonial	  British	  transcribed	   it	  suttee.)	  The	  rite	  was	  not	  practiced	  universally	  and	  was	  not	  caste-­‐	   or	   class-­‐fixed.	   The	   abolition	   of	   this	   rite	   by	   the	   British	   has	   been	  generally	  understood	  as	  a	  case	  of	   ‘White	  men	  saving	  brown	  women	  from	  brown	   men’.	   White	   women—from	   the	   nineteenth-­‐century	   British	  Missionary	   Registers	   to	   Mary	   Daly—have	   not	   produced	   an	   alternative	  understanding.	   Against	   this	   is	   the	   Indian	   nativist	   argument,	   a	   parody	   of	  nostalgia	  for	  lost	  origins:	  ‘The	  women	  actually	  wanted	  to	  die.’45	  The	  quotation	   from	  Spivak	   is,	   I	   believe,	  of	   very	   strong	   relevance	   to	  animal	   studies	  generally,	   the	   challenge	   of	   understanding	   anthropocentricism,	   and	   the	   problem	   of	  how	   violence	   renders	   its	   subject.	   It	   partly	   serves	   as	   a	   reminder	   that	   the	   ethical	  problem	   of	   animal	   suffering	   as	   we	   currently	   frame	   it	   has	   its	   limits	   and	   creates	   a	  logical	   structure	   that	   is	  difficult	   to	  escape.	  The	  politics	  of	   suffering—the	   insistence	  on	  determining	  if	  fish	  feel	  pain	  and	  shaping	  social	  and	  political	  responses	  only	  to	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question—generates	  its	  own	  politics	  and	  its	  own	  subjectivities	  which	  become	   irrefutable.	   If	   pro-­‐animal	   advocates	   explain	   that	  we	  want	   to	   save	   animals	  from	  suffering,	  or	  reduce	  the	  suffering	  of	  animals	  through	  welfare	  practices—if	  this	  is	   the	  only	   frame	  we	  have	   at	   our	  disposal—then	  we	   run	   the	   risk	  of	   being	   trapped	  within	   this	   truth,	   and	  more	   importantly,	   the	   animals	  we	   are	   trying	   to	   ‘save’	   being	  trapped	  by	  this	  truth.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  not	  respond	  to	  violence,	  or	  that	   existing	   responses	   have	   no	   value;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   work	   by	   scholars	   and	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activists	  to	  highlight	  this	  suffering	  has	  been	  immensely	  successful	  in	  shaping	  public	  perceptions.	  However,	  even	  valuable	  responses	  participate	  in	  systems	  of	  truth	  that	  generate	   their	   own	   violence.	   Speaking	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   discourse	   of	   rights	   for	  women,	  Wendy	   Brown	   acknowledges	   the	   bittersweet	   attachment	   we	   can	   have	   to	  some	   emancipatory	   discourses,	   which	   both	   create	   relief	   from	   suffering	   yet,	  simultaneously,	  create	  the	  terms	  for	  continuing	  domination:	  	  if	   violence	   is	   upon	   you,	   almost	   any	  means	   of	   reducing	   it	   is	   of	   value.	   The	  problem	  surfaces	   in	   the	  question	  of	  when	  and	  whether	  rights	   for	  women	  are	  formulated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  enable	  the	  escape	  of	  the	  subordinated	  from	   the	   site	  of	   that	   violation,	   and	  when	  and	  whether	   they	  build	   a	   fence	  around	   us	   at	   that	   site,	   regulating	   rather	   than	   challenging	   the	   conditions	  within.46	  Arguably	   animal	   advocates	   face	   this	   same	   dilemma	   with	   respect	   to	   improved	  welfare	  protections	   for	   animals	   aimed	  at	   reducing	   suffering.	  On	  one	  hand,	   at	   least	  with	  respect	  to	  land	  animals	  used	  for	  food,	  there	  have	  been	  tangible	  improvements	  in	   the	  conditions	  of	  containment	  and	  slaughter.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  critics	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  reduction	  in	  suffering	  has	  not	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  use;	  on	  the	  contrary	  there	  has	  been	  an	  exponential	  global	  increase	  in	  the	  scale	  and	  intensity	  of	  animal	  utilisation	  for	  food.47	  As	  Deirdre	  Bourke	  suggests,	  ‘animal	  welfare	  legislation	  is	  often	  used	  not	  just	  to	  protect	  animals	  but	  also	  to	  regulate,	  and	  indeed	  facilitate,	   the	   ongoing	   use	   of	   animals’.48	   Recent	   ‘thought	   experiments’	   on	   the	  possibility	  of	  bioengineering	  livestock	  to	  not	  feel	  pain,	  only	  seem	  to	  further	  highlight	  the	   problem	   related	   to	   political	   and	   ethical	   claims	   that	   are	   solely	   based	   on	   the	  reduction	   of	   animal	   suffering	   as	   a	   goal.49	   Just	   as	   Spivak	  might	   suggest	   there	   is	   an	  epistemic	   violence	   in	   imagining	   that	   the	   solution—the	   only	   solution—that	   Indian	  women	  wanted	  to	  the	  ritual	  practice	  of	  sati	  was	  to	  be	  saved	  by	  British	  colonisers,	  we	  might	  similarly	  ask	  if	  the	  only	  solution	  available	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  large-­‐scale	  human	  utilisation	  of	  animals	  is	  to	  reduce	  or	  avoid	  suffering	  (to	  ‘save’	  animals	  who	  suffer).	  	  But	   it	   is	   the	   final	   sentence	   of	   that	   short	   quote	   from	   Spivak	   above	   that	   most	  intrigues	  me,	  and	  is	  relevant	  to	  both	  the	  epistemological	  problem	  of	  how	  we	  imagine	  what	   animals	  might	  want,	   and	   the	   significant	   challenge	   in	   imagining	   that	   animals	  may	   not	   want	   to	   be	   used	   for	   human	   benefit.	   Spivak	   describes	   the	   conservative	  Indian	  response	  defending	  ritual	  widow	  sacrifice	  with	  the	  short,	  ironic	  phrase:	  ‘“The	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women	  actually	  wanted	  to	  die”.’	  In	  observing	  that	  an	  ‘Indian	  nativist’	  defence	  of	  sati	  effectively	  participated	   in	  reproducing	  the	  absurd	   logic	   that	  women	  wanted	  to	  die,	  Spivak	  mocks	  a	  patriarchal	  institutional	  practice	  that	  silences	  women	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  only	  explanation	  for	  why	  women	  would	  consent	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  custom	  is	  the	  preference	  of	  death	  over	  life.	  The	  phrase	  ‘the	  women	  actually	  wanted	  to	  die’	  is	  perfectly	   useable	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   understand	   the	   material	   and	   epistemic	   violence	  humans	  exert	  against	  animals,	  precisely	  because	  our	  epistemic	   framing	  of	  animals,	  and	   the	   monstrous	   systems	   of	   violence	   towards	   animals	   that	   exist	   all	   around	   us,	  appear	  to	  rely	  on	  a	   logic	   that	   ‘the	  animals	  actually	  want	  to	  die’	   for	  our	  benefit	  and	  pleasures.	   Defenders	   of	   animal	   use	   explicitly	   endorse	   this	   messaging	   when	   they	  argue,	  for	  example,	  that	  animals	  used	  by	  humans	  enjoy	  a	  better	  life	  than	  they	  would	  if	  they	  were	  not	  used	  by	  humans.50	  We	  find	  this	  logic	  powerfully	  present	  in	  at	  least	  some	  fishing	  practices,	  where	  fish	  are,	  as	  the	  official	  nomenclature	  used	  by	  the	  UN	  Food	   and	   Agriculture	   Organisation	   states,	   simply	   ‘harvested’	   for	   human	   use	   from	  oceans,	  seas	  and	  rivers.51	  In	  these	  cases	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  fish	  giving	  themselves	  passively	  to	  us	  to	  be	  used,	  with	  no	  particular	  preference	  as	  the	  whether	  they	  continue	  living	  or	  meet	  the	  end	  of	  life	  at	  our	  hands:	  ‘the	  fish	  actually	  wanted	  to	  die.’	  Epistemic	  violence	  renders	  fish	  as	  uninterested	  in	  their	  own	  lives.	  However,	  we	  can	   see	   that	   the	   statement—‘the	   fish	   actually	  wanted	   to	   die’—is	   absurd,	   precisely	  because	  it	  implies	  that	  fish	  lack	  any	  resistance	  to	  being	  used	  for	  our	  benefit	  and,	  like	  the	  fishing	  fantasy	  of	  fish	  throwing	  themselves	  onto	  the	  decks	  of	  boats,	  would	  prefer	  to	  die	  at	  our	  hands	  (or	  at	   least,	  have	  no	  preference	  whether	  they	  die	  or	  not	  at	  our	  hands).	  As	  I	  shall	  discuss	  later,	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  offering	  a	  different	   framing,	   indeed	   the	   need	   to	   continually	   explore	   new	   framings,	   that	   it	   is	  important	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  possibility	  that	  animals,	  including	  sea	  animals,	  resist	  human	  utilisation	  and	  that	  they	  prefer	  not	  to	  be	  used,	  indeed	  they	  prefer	  not	  to	  die.52	  	  
—CONCEPTUALISING ANIMAL RESISTANCE There	   has	   been	   some	   interesting	   scholarly	   work	   within	   animal	   studies	   on	   the	  question	  of	  animal	  resistance.	  Perhaps	  most	  prominent	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Jason	  Hribal,	  which	  documents,	  through	  historical	  case	  studies,	  examples	  of	  animals	  breaking	  free	  from	   human	   control—breaking	   down	   fences,	   escaping	   abattoirs,	   tussling	   with	  human	   controllers,	  maiming	   those	  who	   stand	   in	   their	  way.53	  Hribal’s	  method	   is	   to	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use	  historical	  information	  to	  construct	  narratives	  of	  animal	  resistance.	  For	  example,	  and	  relevant	  to	  my	  focus	  here	  on	  sea	  animals,	  Hribal	  narrates	  the	  successive	  acts	  of	  resistance	   by	   one	   of	   the	   orcas	   at	   Sea	   World,	   Tilikum	   (resistance	   that	   has	   since	  featured	   in	   the	   documentary	   BlackFish).54	   In	   these	   cases,	   animal	   resistance	   is	  conceptualised	   as	   comprising	   intentional	   acts	   of	   insubordination	   against	   human	  domination.	   In	   some	   respects	   we	   have	   the	   resources	   to	   understand	   this	   sort	   of	  resistance	  by	  ‘big	  fish’	  because	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  Western	  cultural	  imaginary.	  Herman	  Melville’s	  Moby	  Dick,	   for	   example,	  was	   a	   similar	   story	   of	   a	   tussle	   between	  Captain	  Ahab	  and	  a	  white	  whale,	  a	  story	  effectively	  of	  domination	  and	  resistance.55	  Similarly	  Ernest	  Hemingway’s	  The	  Old	  Man	  and	  the	  Sea	  enacts	  a	  narrative	  of	  human	  violence	  and	  animal	  resistance	  that	  resonates	  with	  a	  view	  of	  animal	  resistance	  as	  reflecting	  an	   intentional	   tussle	  against	  human	  domination.56	   In	  both	  cases,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	   the	  animal	   would	   prefer	   not	   to	   die.	   I	   note	   that	   to	   an	   extent	   recreational	   fishing	  practices—that	  is,	  fishing	  for	  ‘sport’	  where	  the	  intention	  is	  to	  catch	  fish	  for	  pleasure	  rather	   than	   food—rely	   on	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	   animal	   resistance	   to	   fuel	   human	  pleasure.	   It	   is	   precisely	   because	   fish	   resist	   in	   these	   cases	   that	   recreational	   fishing	  becomes	   a	   ‘sport’;	   since	   the	   supposed	   pleasure	   and	   art	   of	   these	   fishing	   practices	  relies	   upon	   the	   capture	   of	   an	   animal	   who	   eludes	   the	   recreational	   fisher,	   and	  will	  struggle	   against	   the	   line	   when	   hooked	   (more	   on	   the	   hook	   itself	   below).57	   The	  practice	   in	   recreational	   fishing	   of	   ‘playing’	   the	   fish	   once	   they	   are	   hooked—prolonging	   the	   period	   of	   time	   that	   the	   fish	   is	   on	   the	   hook	   so	   that	   they	   swim	  themselves	   to	   exhaustion	   trying	   get	   away—illustrates	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   fish	  resistance,	   or	   at	   least	   one	   understanding	   of	   fish	   resistance,	   as	   comprising	   acts	   of	  insubordination	   against	   human	   domination,	   is	   conceptually	   an	   important	  component	  of	  fishing.58	  	  Against	  the	  above	  conceptualisation	  of	  fish	  resistance,	  some	  may	  argue	  that	  fish	  cannot	  reasonably	  be	  said	  to	  ‘resist’	  human	  domination	  in	  an	  intentional	  or	  ‘agential’	  way.	   Indeed,	   at	   least	   two	   arguments	   could	   be	   made	   here	   against	   the	   above	  conceptualisation	   of	   resistance.	   One	   view	   might	   be	   that	   there	   is	   no	   ‘scientific	  evidence’	   to	   suggest	   that	   fish,	   as	   intentional	   agents,	   work	   against	   human	  domination;	  that	  is,	  fish	  lack	  the	  reasoning	  (or	  other	  agential)	  capacity	  to	  choose	  to	  resist	   or	   subordinate	   human	   domination,	   and	   any	   visible	   evidence	   of	   what	  might	  look	  like	  resistance	  (for	  example,	  fish	  struggling	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  fishing	  line)	  reflects	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‘instinctive’	  rather	  than	  ‘rational’	  behaviour	  (this	  is,	  as	  I	  discussed	  above,	  a	  version	  of	  Descartes’	   animals-­‐as-­‐automatons	  view).	   It	   is	   certainly	  beyond	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  article	   to	  advance	  an	  empirically	  grounded	  argument	   for	   fish	  agency	   in	   relation	   to	  resistance	  based	  upon	  observational	  or	  similar	  studies,	  and,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  the	  epistemological	   problem	   of	   framing	   and	   conceptualising	   fish	   resistance	   might	  prevent	   the	   possibility	   of	   actually	   ‘proving’	   (through	   observational	   studies	   or	  otherwise)	   that	   fish	   ‘resist’	   in	   this	  way.	   If	  mainstay	  scientific	  empirical	  approaches	  cannot	   confirm	   the	   possibility	   of	   fish	   agency	   and	   cognition,	   then	   it	   becomes	  impossible	   to	  mount	  an	  empirically	   sound	  case	   that	   fish	  act	   in	   intentional	  ways	   to	  resist	  human	  domination,	  and	  we	  are	  condemned	  therefore,	  just	  as	  we	  are	  with	  the	  question	  of	  fish	  suffering,	  to	  wait	  for	  science	  to	  prove	  one	  way	  or	  another	  that	  fish,	  or	  at	  least	  most	  fish,	  might	  be	  able	  to	  resist.	  One	  solution	  for	  this	  is	  to	  rethink	  how	  we	  frame	  agency	  and	  its	  alignment	  with	  intentionality,	  as	  in	  Agnieszka	  Kowalczyk’s	  suggestion	   that	   ‘acts	   of	   resisting	   exploitation	   performed	   by	   non	   human	   bodies	   do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  be	  thoughtful	  ...	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  significant’.59	  But	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	   below,	   we	   do	   not	   need	   to	   prove	   that	   fish	   exercise	   what	   we	   normatively	  might	   construct	  as	   ‘agency’	   to	  understand	   that	   they	   resist	  human	  domination;	   this	  depends	  on	  the	  conceptual	  model	  of	  resistance	  we	  use.	  There	   is	   a	   second,	   and	   I	   would	   suggest	   more	   sophisticated,	   version	   of	   the	  argument	  that	  animals,	  and	  hence	  fish,	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  resist	  human	  domination.	  This	  argument	  suggests	  we	  have	  such	  intense	  systems	  of	  violence	  and	  containment	  applying	  to	  animals,	  that	  it	  is	  literally	  not	  possible	  for	  animals	  to	  resist	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  engaging	  in	  meaningful	  power	  relations.	  This	  view	  argues	  that	  since	  these	  forms	  of	   domination	   seem	   overwhelmingly	   one-­‐sided	   and	   oriented	   to	   remove	   any	  possibility	  of	  escape,	   then	  there	   is	  no	  possibility	  of	   interaction	  or	  response.	  This	   is	  the	  view	  put	  forward	  by	  Clare	  Palmer	  in	  an	  early	  example	  of	  a	  discussion	  of	  animal	  resistance.60	   Within	   the	   context	   of	   this	   discussion,	   Palmer	   follows	   a	   Foucauldian	  approach	  to	  argue	  that	  resistance	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  animals	  caught	  within	  intensive	  systems	   of	   domination.	   ‘There	   is	   no	   relationship	   ...	   All	   spontaneity	   and	   almost	   all	  communication	   is	   removed	   from	  our	   brutal	   encounter.	   Thus	   it	   cannot	   be	   a	   power	  
relationship.’61	   Resistance,	   in	   this	   view,	   is	   only	   possible	   where	   entities	   subject	   to	  violence	   have	   some	   means	   of	   response	   or	   reaction	   to	   engage	   with	   relations	   of	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power.	  Where	  there	  is	  no	  perceived	  freedom	  to	  move	  by	  the	  victim	  of	  violence,	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  of	  power.	  	  Against	   the	  view	  put	   forward	  by	  Palmer,	   I	  would	  suggest	   that	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  imagine	  resistance	  if	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  instrumentation	  of	  violence	  used	  to	  dominate	  animals,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  apparatuses	  effectively	  work	  against	  the	  active	  resistance	  of	  animals,	  even	  if,	  from	  the	  outside,	  these	  relations	  appear	  to	  involve	  no	  contest	  or	  be	  unilaterally	  one-­‐sided	  in	  character.	  In	  an	  important	  essay,	  Tim	  Ingold	  reminds	  us	  that	  violence	  always	  aims	  to	  put	  down	  and	  contest	  resistance.62	  Indeed,	  the	   technologies	  of	   violence	  would	  not	  be	  used	   if	   the	  objects	  of	   violence	  were	  not	  autonomous	  or	  had	  not	  evaded	  capture	  and	  utilisation	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  	  Consider	   the	   slave-­‐driver,	   whip	   in	   hand,	   compelling	   his	   slave	   to	   toil	  through	   the	   brute	   infliction	   of	   severe	   pain.	   Clearly	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	  slave	  in	  this	  situation	  to	  act	  according	  to	  his	  own	  volition	  is	  very	  seriously	  curtailed.	  Does	   this	  mean	   that	   the	   slave	   responds	   in	  a	  purely	  mechanical	  way	   to	   the	   stroke	   of	   the	   whip?	   Far	   from	   it.	   For	   when	   we	   speak	   of	   the	  application	   of	   force	   in	   this	   kind	   of	   situation,	   we	   impute	   to	   the	   recipient	  powers	   of	   resistance—powers	  which	   the	   infliction	   of	   pain	   is	   specifically	  intended	  to	  break	  down.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  use	  of	  force	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  slave	  is	  a	  being	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  and	  suffer,	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  a	  person.	  And	  when	  we	  say	  that	  the	  master	  causes	  the	  slave	  to	  work,	  the	  causation	  is	  personal,	  not	  mechanical:	  it	  lies	  in	  the	  social	  relation	  between	  master	  and	  slave,	  which	  is	  clearly	  one	  of	  domination.	  In	  fact,	  the	  original	   connotation	   of	   ‘force’	   was	   precisely	   that	   of	   action	   intentionally	  directed	  against	  the	  resistance	  of	  another	  sentient	  being.63	  This	   understanding	   of	   resistance	   treats	   instruments	   of	   violence,	   and	   their	  technological	  development,	  as	  intimately	  related	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  resistance	  that	  they	  encounter	   in	   their	   target.	   Here,	   the	   resisting	   body	   generates	   the	   need	   for	   the	  instrument	   of	   violence,	   and	   technological	   refinement	   in	   the	   instrumentation	   of	  violence	   corresponds	   with	   the	   continuing	   creativity	   and	   innovation	   of	   those	   who	  resist.	  	  This	   view	   of	   resistance	   as	   generated	   by,	   and	   working	   intimately	   against,	  systems	  of	  production	  correlates	  with	  what	  I	  would	  describe	  as	  an	  ‘autonomous’	  or	  
operaist	  model	  of	  resistance.	  In	  understanding	  this	  model	  of	  resistance,	  I	  have	  been	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influenced	   by	   both	   the	   Italian	  Marxist	   operaist	   tendency,	   and	   by	   the	  more	   recent	  work	  of	  Fahim	  Amir,	  who	  explores	  operaism	  as	  way	  to	  explain	  animal	  subordination	  in	  systems	  of	  production.64	   In	  this	  view,	  systems	  of	  production	  and	  exchange,	  such	  as	  capitalism,	  suck	  the	  productive	  capacities	  and	  creativity	  of	  the	  bodies	  that	  labour	  within	   these	   systems.	   This	   is	   essentially	   a	   parasitic	   relation,	   where	   resistance	   is	  captured	   and	   redeployed	   through	   systems	   of	   subordination.65	   Here,	   even	   extreme	  forms	  of	  domination	  that	  appear	  to	  lack	  any	  movement	  or	  resistance	  are	  in	  fact	  the	  product	   of	   active	   forms	   of	   creative	   resistance	   by	   those	   who	   are	   subordinated;	   a	  resistance	   that	   is	   subsequently	   coopted	   in	   the	   process	   of	   domination.	   Thus,	   the	  means	  used	  to	  restrain	  and	  intensively	  dominate	  animals	  are	  themselves	  a	  product	  of	   the	   active	   forms	   of	   resistance	   employed	   by	   animals	   towards	   human	  instrumentalisation.	  This	   autonomous	  or	  operaist	  model	   of	   resistance	  dynamically	  re-­‐understands	  the	  way	  production	  occurs	  so	  that	  systems	  of	  domination	  must	  keep	  pace	  with	  new	  forms	  of	  resistance	  to	  extract	  productivity	  (this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	   ‘subsumption’	   inherent	   to	   production).66	   For	   example,	   as	   Michael	   Hardt	   and	  Antonio	   Negri	   have	   argued,	   the	   novel	   flexibilities	   in	   workplaces	   that	   characterise	  post-­‐Fordist	   production	   (flexible	   work	   hours,	   work	   from	   home	   arrangements,	  teleworking	   and	   so	   on)	   are	   the	   result	   of	   capitalism	   adapting	   to	   the	   resistance	   of	  workers	   to	  Fordist	  modes	  of	  disciplined	  production.	   It	   is	  because	  workers	  actively	  dropped	   out	   of	   labour	   through	   absenteeism,	   through	   cultural	   experimentation,	  through	   everyday	   sabotage,	   that	   capitalism	   needed	   to	   adapt	   and	   re-­‐mould	   work	  itself	   to	   maintain	   productivity.67	   Here	   resistance	   is	   always	   present,	   but	   it	   only	  becomes	  apparent	  where	  there	  is	  organised	  confrontation;	  without	  this	  there	  is	  an	  apparently	   seamless	   view	   of	   production,	   where	   those	   who	   are	   subject	   to	   intense	  forms	   of	   domination	   and	   discipline	   appear	   to	   be	   working	   cohesively	   with	   the	  production	  apparatus.	  As	  Mario	  Tronti	  observes:	  Workers’	   struggles	   determine	   the	   course	   of	   capitalist	   development;	   but	  capitalist	   development	   will	   use	   those	   struggles	   for	   its	   own	   ends	   if	   no	  organized	   revolutionary	   process	   opens	   up,	   capable	   of	   changing	   that	  balance	   of	   forces.	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   this	   in	   the	   case	   of	   social	   struggles	   in	  which	   the	   entire	   systemic	   apparatus	   of	   domination	   repositions	   itself,	  reforms,	  democratizes	  and	  stabilizes	  itself	  anew.68	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We	   might	   apply	   this	   autonomist	   view	   of	   resistance	   to	   understanding	   the	  relationship	   between	   emerging	   technological	   and	   production	   processes	   and	  confrontation	   in	   the	   context	   of	   animal	   containment,	   breeding	   and	   slaughter.	   One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  curved	  corrals	  used	  in	  slaughterhouses.69	  The	  introduction	  of	  curves	   into	   the	   chutes	   or	   races	   that	   led	   cattle	   towards	   death	   minimised	   the	  possibility	  of	  an	  animal	  responding	  to	  the	  chute	  by	  balking	  and	  backing	  up.70	   In	  so	  far	   as	   the	   curves	  work	   to	   smooth	   the	   process	   of	   slaughter	   and	  work	  with	   (rather	  than	   against)	   animal	   movement,	   these	   curved	   corrals	   directly	   respond	   to,	   and	  ‘lubricate’	  animal	  resistance.71	  I	  should	  be	  clear	  here	  that	  this	  cooption	  of	  resistance	  need	  not	  lead	  to	  outcomes	  that	  increase	  the	  suffering	  of	  animals;	  quite	  the	  reverse.	  Working	  to	  counter	  resistance	  in	  this	  sense	  can	  work	  to	  promote	  enhanced	  welfare	  outcomes;	   the	  curved	  corals	  arguably	  reduce	   the	  suffering	  of	  animals	  before	  death	  (suffering	   at	   least	  with	   respect	   to	   stress,	   and	   the	   cognition	  and	  anticipation	  of	   the	  death	  to	  come).	  However,	  the	  curves	  also	  function	  to	  manage	  resistance	  and	  enable	  the	   smooth	   process	   of	   slaughter,	   maximising	   the	   efficacy	   of	   human	   utilisation.	  Bodies	   shape	   productive	   processes,	  while	   production	   shapes	   bodies;	   in	   this	   sense	  the	   ‘agency’	   of	   animals	   (as	   at	   least	   as	   resistive	   agents)	   is	   generated	   as	   a	   political	  subjectivity.	  Hardt	  and	  Negri	   state:	   ‘The	  great	   industrial	  and	   financial	  powers	   thus	  produce	   not	   only	   commodities	   but	   also	   subjectivities.	   They	   produce	   agentic	  subjectivities	   within	   the	   biopolitical	   context:	   they	   produce	   needs,	   social	   relations,	  bodies,	  and	  minds-­‐which	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  produce	  producers.’72	  	  In	   some	   respects,	   thinking	   about	   resistance	   in	   this	   way	   is	   a	   different	   sort	   of	  ‘relational	   approach’	   to	   thinking	   about	   how	   we	   engage	   with	   animals.	   ‘Relational	  approaches’	  are	  currently	  enjoying	  much	  interest	  within	  the	  field	  of	  human	  animal	  studies,	  through	  a	  range	  of	  perspectives	  such	  as	  those	  offered	  by	  Clare	  Palmer,	  John	  Law	  (discussed	  below),	  Donna	  Haraway	  and	  Elspeth	  Probyn.73	  At	  least	  some	  of	  these	  approaches	   quite	   explicitly	   question	   ‘dualistic’	   accounts	   of	   human	   animal	  relations—such	  as	  animal	  rights	  accounts	  which	  emphasise	  one-­‐sided	  domination	  of	  animals	   by	   humans—by	   focusing	   upon	   forms	   of	   shared	   relationality	   and	  working,	  where	  animals	  and	  humans	   ‘co-­‐shape’	  each	  other	  and	  might	  derive	  mutual	  benefit	  from	  their	  relationships.74	  The	  view	  I	  advance	  here	  differs	  from	  these	  approaches	  in	  so	  far	  as	  I	  argue	  that	  conflict	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  thinking	  about	  relationality:	  we	  are	  in	  relation	  with	  animals,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  relation	  essentially	  of	  hostility.	  As	  I	  argue	  in	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the	   conclusion	   below,	   this	   conflict	   need	   not	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   dead	   end,	   but	   can	  comprise	   a	   potential	   beginning	   for	   different	   (and	   hopefully	   less	   violent)	  relationalities.	  
—THREE TECHNOLOGIES: HOOK, PURSE SEINE, AQUACULTURE Building	  on	  this	  conceptualisation	  of	  resistance,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  offer	  three	  examples	  of	  how	  we	  might	  conceptualise	  fish	  resistance,	  through	  a	  focus	  on	  three	  technologies	  used	  to	  capture,	  utilise	  and	  slaughter	  fish:	  the	  hook,	  the	  purse	  seine	  and	  aquaculture.	  This	  identification	  of	  technologies	  conforms	  to	  the	  autonomous	  or	  operaist	  view	  of	  resistance	   I	   have	   described	   above.	   All	   these	   examples	   are	   framed	   by	   the	  understanding	   that	   these	   technologies	   aim	   precisely	   to	   counter	   and	   put	   down	  resistance;	  as	  such,	  the	  technology	  itself	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  active	  politics	  of	   restraint	   and	   resistance	   involved	   in	   fishing	   practices,	   without	   having	   to	  demonstrate	  that	  fish	  display	  normatively	  defined	  intentionality	  and	  agency.	  
Hook The	   hook	   is	   possibly	   one	   of	   the	   oldest	   human	   technological	   innovations	   for	   the	  capture	  of	  animal	  life.75	  This	  technological	  development	  allowed	  sea	  animals,	  which	  otherwise	  evade	  capture,	  to	  be	  hunted	  just	  as	  land-­‐based	  animals	  were	  also	  hunted.	  Describing	  evidence	  of	  100,000-­‐year-­‐old	  human	  remains	  at	  the	  Klasies	  River	  Mouth	  caves	  in	  Africa,	  Richard	  Klein	  and	  Blake	  Edgar	  observe	  that	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  these	  people	  avoided	  confrontation	  and	  risky	  hunting	  practices:	  	  the	   people	   tended	   to	   avoid	   confrontations	  with	   the	  more	   common—and	  more	   dangerous—buffalo	   to	   pursue	   a	   more	   docile	   and	   less	   common	  antelope,	   the	   eland.	   Both	   buffalo	   and	   eland	   are	   very	   large	   animals,	   but	  buffalo	  stand	  and	  resist	  potential	  predators,	  while	  eland	  panic	  and	  flee	  at	  signs	  of	  danger.76	  	  They	  also	  suggest	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  fishing	  among	  these	  people	  who	  dwelled	  near	   the	   water,	   reflecting	   a	   ‘difference	   of	   technology’	   compared	   to	   later	   humans.	  Fish	  resist	  differently	  to	  buffalo:	  they	  evade	  capture,	  they	  are	  elusive.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  fishing	  gear	  is	  developed	  that	  it	  becomes	  feasible	  to	  counter	  this	  resistance:	  	  only	   the	   more	   recent	   sites	   contain	   probable	   fishing	   gear	   like	   grooved	  stones	  for	  weighting	  nets	  or	  lines	  and	  carefully	  shaped	  toothpick-­‐size	  bone	  
	   	  VOLUME22 NUMBER1 MAR2016	  214 
splinters	  that	  could	  have	  been	  baited	  and	  tied	  to	  lines	  like	  hooks.	  In	  short,	  only	   the	   more	   recent	   people	   undeniably	   possessed	   the	   technology	   for	  fishing.77	  	  In	   this	   sense	   the	   hook	   is	   one	   of	   the	   technological	   innovations	   which	   shifted	   the	  nature	  of	  human	  hunting	  practice,	  and	  opened	  the	  sea	  as	  a	  ‘commons’	  for	  the	  human	  pursuit	  of	   animal	  based	   food.78	  Forbes	  magazine	   recently	   listed	   the	  hook	  as	  one	  of	  the	  twenty	  most	  important	  tools	  invented.79	  	  The	   hook	   would	   not	   be	   necessary	   if	   fish	   allowed	   themselves	   to	   be	   passively	  ‘harvested’.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   precisely	   because	   fish	   elude	  human	   capture	   that	  the	  hook	  was	  devised.	  The	  fish	  hook	  is	  an	  ingenious	  capture	  and	  kill	  device.80	  It	  is	  a	  sharp	  point	  with	  a	  bend	  in	  it,	  which	  can	  be	  affixed	  to	  a	  line,	  allowing	  its	  operator	  to	  work	   at	   a	   distance.	   The	   bend	   is	   crucial,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   the	   hook	   aims	   to	   not	  merely	  impale	   its	   recipient,	   but	   to	   snag	   the	  body	  of	   the	   fish	   to	   the	  hook,	   allowing	   it	   to	  be	  drawn	  in	  by	  a	  line.	  The	  hook	  frequently	  works	  with	  a	  lure	  or	  bait.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  hook	   is	  a	  stealth	  device;	   it	  aims	  to	  deceive	  an	  animal	  who	  would	  evade	  capture	  by	  other	   means.	   The	   hook	   was	   thus	   fundamentally	   conceived	   to	   work	   against	   fish	  resistance	  to	  capture.	  Elaine	  Scarry,	  in	  her	  classic	  study	  of	  torture,	  The	  Body	  in	  Pain,	  points	  out	  that	  the	  most	  ingenious	  torture	  devices	  use	  the	  body	  of	  the	  victim	  against	  itself.81	   The	   fish	   hook	   is	   no	   different.	   When	   it	   finds	   sinuous	   flesh	   with	   which	   to	  impale	   itself	  on	  and	  bind	   itself	   to,	   the	  body	  of	   the	   fish	   is	  effectively	   turned	  against	  the	  self;	  the	  fish	  will	  struggle	  against	  its	  own	  mouth	  (or	  elsewhere—the	  gut,	  the	  eye)	  which	  has	  been	  caught	  by	   the	  hook,	  sometimes	  deepening	   the	  hold	  of	   the	  hook	  on	  the	  flesh.82	  The	  technical	  innovation	  of	  the	  barb	  in	  the	  hook—a	  counter	  facing	  spur	  near	   the	   point—heightened	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   hook	   as	   a	   technology	   to	   refuse	  resistance.	  The	  barb	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  a	  fish	  to	  free	  themself	  once	  impaled;	  freedom	  from	  the	  hook	  is	  only	  possible	  through	  further	  laceration.	  The	   discussions	   that	   are	   presently	   occurring	   within	   the	   recreational—‘catch	  and	   release’—fishing	   community	   on	   whether	   barbless	   hooks	   should	   be	   used	   on	  ethical	   (and	   sustainability)	   grounds	   are	   interesting	   in	   this	   regard.83	   Recreational	  fishing,	  as	  I	  have	  stated,	  derives	  its	  supposed	  pleasure	  from	  the	  resistance	  of	  fish	  to	  capture.	  Recreational	  fishing	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  merely	  impaling	  fish,	  but	  the	  whole	  process	   of	   drawing	   in	   a	   struggling	   fish,	   and	   then,	   if	   the	   animal	   survives,	   setting	   it	  free.	   The	   barb	   in	   the	   hook	   offers	   an	   additional	   safeguard	   against	   the	   fish	   slipping	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away	  once	  impaled;	  however,	  it	  risks	  further	  injury	  or	  death	  to	  the	  fish,	  particularly	  if	  the	  fish	  is	  impaled	  in	  the	  gut,	  working	  against	  the	  stated	  aim	  of	  recreational	  fishing	  to	  merely	  catch	  and	  return	   fish	  as	  sport.	   In	  some	  respects	   it	  should	  be	  no	  surprise	  that	   hook	  development	   can	  work	   to	  maximise	   resistance	   to	   enhance	   the	   ‘sport’	   of	  fishing.	   For	   example,	   ‘circle	   hooks’	   incorporate	   a	   wider	   curve	   to	   more	   efficiently	  facilitate	  sport	  fishing;	  this	  ‘unique	  hook	  shape	  causes	  the	  hook	  to	  slide	  toward	  the	  point	  of	  resistance	  and	  embed	  itself	   in	  the	  jaw	  or	  in	  the	  corner	  of	  the	  fish’s	  mouth.	  The	  actual	  curved	  shape	  of	  the	  hook	  keeps	  the	  hook	  from	  catching	  in	  the	  gut	  cavity	  or	   throat.’84	   The	   Florida	   Sea	   Grant	   research	   circular	   I	   quote	   from	  here	   goes	   on	   to	  explain	  that	  ‘fish	  hooked	  in	  the	  corner	  of	  the	  mouth	  or	  jaw	  tend	  to	  fight	  better	  than	  fish	  that	  are	  hooked	  in	  the	  gut.’85	  Here,	  resistance	  itself,	  maximising	  the	  intensity	  of	  resistance,	  making	  it	  persist,	  is	  the	  objective	  of	  productive	  activity,	  its	  raison	  d'être.	  On	  one	  hand	  recreational	   fishing	  tells	  us	  a	   lot	  about	  the	  sorry	  state	  of	   fish	  welfare,	  and	   the	   limited	   impact	   welfare	   considerations	   or	   the	   possibility	   of	   fish	   suffering	  have	  upon	  some	   fishing	  practices.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   though,	   it	   tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  investment	  recreational	  fishing	  has	  in	  fish	  resistance,	  since	  this	  practice	  is	  only	   deemed	   productively	   pleasurable	   (for	   the	   fisherperson)	   if	   the	   fish	   remains	  bound	   to	   the	   line	  until	   the	   fisherperson	  releases	   it,	   even	   if	   this	  process	  of	   struggle	  and	  resistance	  leads	  to	  the	  unplanned	  death	  of	  the	  fish	  itself.	  	  
Purse seine The	  net	  is	  another	  innovation	  in	  fish	  capture	  and,	  like	  the	  hook,	  it	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  human	  use.86	  The	  net	  is	  a	  discriminating	  capture	  device,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  respects:	  the	  use	  of	  rope	  or	  twine	  in	  a	  mesh	  pattern	  allows	  water	  and	  small	  creatures	  to	  move	  through	   the	   device,	   while	   ensnaring	   larger	   target	   fish.	   In	   relation	   to	   mechanised	  fishing,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  focus	  on	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  net-­‐based	   fishing,	   particularly	   trawling	   (where	   a	   net	   is	   pulled	   through	   the	   water	   at	  speed)	  and	  the	   lack	  of	  discrimination	  in	  net	   fishing	  with	  respect	  to	  particular	   ‘high	  value	  megafauna’	  who	  are	  caught	  as	   ‘by-­‐catch’	   (such	  as	  dolphins).87	  Like	   the	  hook,	  the	   net	   is	   a	   technological	   innovation	   designed	   to	   capture	   animals	   that	   would	  otherwise	  evade	  capture.	  As	  I	  have	  stated,	  net	  fishing	  is	  an	  old	  technique	  of	  human	  hunting;	   today,	   industrialisation	   has	   mechanised	   this	   practice	   of	   predation	   to	  massively	   increase	   its	   efficiency.	   Trawl	   netting,	   for	   example,	   frequently	   uses	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motorised	  speed	  and	  net	  breadth	  and	  depth	  to	  run	  down	  groups	  of	  fish	  in	  the	  water;	  fish	  will	  swim	  themselves	  to	  exhaustion	  before	  they	  finally	  surrender	  to	  the	  net.88	  	  An	   example	   of	   a	   net	   that	   is	   commonly	   used	   within	   industrialised	   wild	   fish	  capture,	  and	  a	  technology	  that	  works	  to	  counter	  the	  resistance	  of	   fish,	   is	   the	  purse	  seine.89	  The	  purse	  seine	  is	  like	  a	  large	  drawstring	  bag.	  A	  large	  net—which	  can	  be	  up	  to	   a	   kilometre	   long	   and	   two	  hundred	  metres	  deep—is	   threaded	  over	   an	   area,	   and	  then	  pulled	   inwards	  to	  trap	  the	  animals	  within.	  This	  method	  is	  very	  different	   from	  trawl	   fishing.	   Rather	   than	   using	   sheer	   speed	   to	   capture	   fish,	   the	   purse	   seine	   uses	  stealth	  to	  encircle	  them.	  Decoys	  can	  be	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  fishing	  operations;	  for	  example,	  floating	  objects,	  or	  ‘fish	  aggregating	  devices’	  (FADs),	  which	  attract	  fish,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  congregate	  fish	  before	  the	  purse	  seine	  is	  used.90	  The	  net	  technology	  can	  work	   to	   selectively	   target	   species:	   ‘the	   geometry	   of	   the	   net	   during	   the	   set	   is	   also	  significant	   for	   understanding	   the	   vertical	   dimension	   of	   the	   operation,	   and	   the	  volume	   enclosed,	   which	   may	   determine	   which	   schools	   and	   individuals	   are	  captured’.91	  This	  sort	  of	  industrial-­‐scale	  net	  fishing	  can	  generate	  immense	  welfare	  concerns.	  For	   example,	  when	   the	   net	   is	   drawn	   in,	  many	   fish	  will	   die	   as	   they	   are	   crushed	  by	  other	   fish	   on	   top	   of	   them.	   Here,	   fish	   resistance	   can	   be	   used	   directly	   to	   facilitate	  human	   intention.	  As	   the	  net	   is	   drawn	   in,	   fish	  will	   thrash	   and	   struggle.	  The	   closing	  encircling	  space	  means	  that	   fish	  will	  come	  into	  violent	  contact	  with	  other	   fish,	  and	  many	  fish	  will	   injure	  or	  kill	   themselves	   in	   this	  process.92	  One	  practice	   in	   industrial	  purse	   seine	   fishing	   is	   to	  progressively	   close	   the	  net	   and	  allow	   fish	   to	   struggle	   and	  injure	   each	   other	   as	   the	   compression	   by	   the	   net	   increases	   (this	   is	  why	   blood	  will	  surface	   on	   the	   water	   as	   the	   net	   constricts).93	   A	   pump	   or	   a	   ‘brailer’	   (a	   smaller	  scooping	  net)	  is	  then	  used	  to	  extract	  fish	  nearer	  the	  surface,	  many	  of	  whom	  may	  be	  injured	  or	  already	  dead.	  Once	  these	  fish	  are	  pumped	  or	  brailed	  onto	  the	  ship,	  the	  net	  is	   tightened	   further,	   and	   the	   process	   begins	   again.	   Fish	   resistance,	   against	   the	  prospect	  of	   their	  own	  death,	   is	  here	  subsumed	  and	  utilised	  as	  a	  means	  to	  facilitate	  human	  productivity	  in	  wild	  fish	  capture.	  Purse	   seine	   fishing	   is	   another	   example	   of	   how	   we	   might	   conceptualise	   fish	  resistance	   in	  relation	   to	   technological	   innovation.	  The	  purse	  seine,	   like	   the	  hook	   is	  an	   ancient	   technology.	   But	   it	   is	   used	  with	   contemporary	   technologies:	   helicopters	  used	   to	   search	   out	   fish	   schools,	   mechanised	   sea	   transport	   including	   speed	   boats	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designed	   to	   string	   the	   encircled	   area,	   the	  Puretic	  Power	  Block	  which	   is	   capable	  of	  hauling	  large	  nets	  in	  to	  the	  boat,	  the	  pump	  which	  can	  smoothly	  extract	  fish	  from	  the	  water	  directly	  to	   ice	  slurries	  below	  deck.94	  These	  technologies	  are	  accompanied	  by	  techniques	   which	   are	   refined	   year	   after	   year	   to	   more	   efficiently	   capture	   fish;	   for	  example,	   the	   use	   of	   floating	   devices,	   or	   the	   use	   of	   the	   compression	   and	   pump	  technique	   I	   have	   already	   described.	   These	   techniques	   and	   technologies	   all	   aim	   to	  counter	   resistance;	   their	   promise	   of	   improved	   efficiency	   relates	   to	   their	   ability	   to	  capture	  entities	  that	  evade	  and	  resist	  capture.	  
Aquaculture Commercial	  wild	  fishing	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  a	  form	  of	  hunting.95	  It	  operates	  today	  as	  a	   peculiar	   industrial	   form	   of	   mechanised	   predation.	   In	   this	   respect,	   commercial	  fishing	  is	  unlike	  any	  other	  large-­‐scale	  form	  of	  animal	  utilisation	  for	  food	  by	  humans.	  Industrialised	  ‘farm’-­‐based	  domestication	  dominates	  the	  production	  of	  land	  animals	  for	  human	  consumption,	  but	  mechanised	  hunting	  of	  ‘wild	  fish’	  remains	  the	  main	  way	  most	   of	   the	   globe	   obtains	   fish	   for	   food.	   In	   so	   far	   as	   fish	   numbers	   in	   the	   wild	   are	  abundant	   enough	   to	   sustain	   this	   sort	   of	   hunting	   industry,	   at	   least	   at	   present,	   and,	  simultaneously,	   the	   evolved	   techniques	   and	   technologies	   for	   wild	   fishing	   are	  effective	  enough	  (that	  is,	  effective	  in	  countering	  fish	  resistance	  to	  them),	  this	  sort	  of	  predation	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  remains	  economically	  viable.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  stated	  above,	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  there	  has	  been	  an	  extraordinary	  explosion	  in	  the	  development	  of	  aquaculture	  which	  has	  substantially	  shifted	   the	   nature	   of	   large-­‐scale	   fishing	   industries.	   In	   some	   respects,	   the	  development	  of	  aquaculture	  is	  itself	  a	  technological	  response	  to	  fish	  resistance.	  We	  know	  that	  since	  the	  1980s	  the	  number	  of	  wild	  fish	  caught	  on	  a	  global	  level	  has	  more	  or	   less	   stayed	   the	   same.96	   It	   is	   aquaculture	   that	  has	   filled	   the	  gap	   in	   supplying	   the	  remaining	   fish	   used	   for	   human	   consumption.	   On	   one	   hand,	   there	   is	   an	  environmental	  explanation	  for	  this:	  as	  experts	  have	  repeatedly	  warned,	  wild	  fishing	  is	  at	   capacity	  or	  being	  actively	  over	  exploited	   for	  many	   fish	  species.	  However,	   this	  perspective	   assumes	   that	   fish	   are	  merely	   passive	   objects	   that	  must	   be	   found	   and	  ‘harvested’	   (that	   is,	   the	  epistemic	  problem	   I	   referred	   to	  above).	  A	  different	  way	   to	  conceptualise	   this	   is	   to	  see	   that	   the	  human	  technical	  means	   for	  capturing	  wild	   fish	  through	  mechanised	  hunting	   technologies	  have	  reached	   their	   limit.	  The	  economics	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are	  poor	  in	  terms	  of	  trying	  to	  hunt	  the	  remaining	  fish	  who	  currently	  evade	  capture,	  and	   because	   of	   these	   hunting	   activities	   fish	   are	   not	   able	   to	   ‘replenish’	   themselves	  through	  reproduction	  to	  meet	  growing	  human	  demand	  for	  food.	  (Certainly,	  we	  know	  that	  regulatory	  controls	  have	  had	  a	  limited	  effect	  in	  preventing	  wild	  fish	  exploitation	  on	   a	   global	   level.)97	   Economic	   realities	   associated	   with	   trying	   to	   capture	   evasive	  animals	  who	  are	  scarce,	  depleting	  and	  evade	  capture,	  must	  surely	  drive	  the	  viability	  of	   other	   options,	   including	   intensive	   farming.	   Thus	   more	   concentrated	   forms	   of	  utilisation,	  such	  as	  aquaculture,	  have	  become	  economically	  viable.	  In	  this	  sense,	  fish	  resistance	  has	  had	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  development	  of	  aquaculture	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  Wild	   fish	   are	   not	   just	   scarce	   because	   humans	   cannot	   find	   them;	   they	   are	   scarce	  because	  they	  evade	  capture.	  Aquaculture	  solves	  this	  problem	  by	  ‘domesticating’	  fish	  into	  enclosed	  ‘farms’.	  Domestication	  is	  a	  solution	  to	  animal	  resistance	  that	  has	  been	  effectively	   applied	   to	   land	   animals	   over	   millennia.98	   It	   is	   now	   being	   applied	   in	  earnest	  to	  fish.	  	  The	   rise	   of	   aquaculture	   need	   not	   produce	   poorer	   outcomes	   for	   fish	   welfare.	  Certainly	   it	   is	   conceivable	   that	   welfare	   provisions	   could	   improve	   as	   a	   result.	   For	  example,	  there	  is	  more	  scope	  to	  use	  relatively	  ‘quick’	  stun	  and	  kill	  methods,	  such	  as	  individually	   stunning	   fish	   with	   a	   blow	   or	   spike,	   or	   using	   new	   techniques	   such	   as	  electrocution.	   In	   so	   far	   as	   health	   outcomes	   are	   considered	   important	   for	   welfare,	  aquaculture	   provides	   opportunities	   to	   prevent	   diseases	   and	   injury	   through	  concentrated	  management.	  	  But	   there	   is	   a	   complex	   story	   of	   resistance	   and	   power	   that	   accompanies	   the	  development	   of	   techniques	   in	   aquaculture,	   including	   those	   oriented	   towards	  improved	  welfare.	   Aquaculture	   holds	   the	   promise	   of	   mitigating	   the	   effects	   of	   fish	  resistance	   on	   a	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   level	   through	   concentrated	   forms	   of	   control.	   This	   is	  because,	  like	  other	  factory	  farms,	  aquaculture	  provides	  operators	  the	  opportunity	  to	  exert	   birth-­‐to-­‐death	   controls	   to	   enable	   a	   more	   refined	   management	   of	   the	   final	  product.	   Perhaps	   tellingly,	   one	   expert	   comments:	   ‘the	   entire	   life	   cycle	   has	   been	  rigorously	   controlled.	  We	   know	  where	   it	  was	   born,	  where	   it	   died,	   and	  what	   it	   ate	  throughout	   its	   entire	   life.’99	   One	   area	   of	   innovation	   is	   being	   able	   to	   control	   for	  parasites	  and	  diseases	  through	  immunisation;	  another	  is	  exerting	  more	  control	  over	  size	  and	  quality	  of	  meat	  offered	   for	  sale,	  enabling	  production	  of	  a	  more	  consistent	  homogenised	   end	   product.100	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   aquaculture	   fish	   lack	   the	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capacity	  to	  resist	  this	  overwhelming	  system	  of	  control;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  aquaculture	  attempts	  to	  manage	  the	  movement	  of	  populations	  that	  are	  themselves	  elusive,	  and	  thus	  represents	  a	  concentrated	  attempt	  to	  deal	  with	  fish	  resistance.	  As	  John	  Law	  has	  noted	  about	  salmon	  farms,	  despite	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  farming	  methods	  fish	  within	  aquaculture	  environments	  defy	  systems	  of	  control	  and	  detection:	  	  The	  salmon	   in	   the	  pen	  are	  more	  or	   less	   invisible.	  Sometimes	  you	  can	  see	  what’s	  going	  on,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  time	  you	  can’t.	  Instead,	  all	  that	  you	  can	  see	  is	  a	  few	  dozen	  salmon	  out	  of	  50,000.	  This	  is	  the	  paradox.	  Even	  though	  they	  are	   being	   controlled,	   the	   salmon	   are	   also	   dissolving	   themselves	   into	  invisibility.	  So	  this	  is	  the	  argument.	  If	  salmon	  are	  animals	  this	  is	  precisely	  because	   in	  relation	   to	  human	  beings	   they	  are	  also	  elusive.	  Down	  there	   in	  the	  water,	  so	  far	  as	  the	  people	  are	  concerned,	  they	  are	  also	  doing	  their	  own	  sweet	  salmon	  thing.101	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  like	  in	  other	  systems	  of	  animal	  based	  production,	  that	  creative	  resistance	   cannot	   be	   captured.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   ‘autonomous’	   view	   of	   resistance	   I	  have	  advanced	  here,	  we	  can	  also	  identify	  a	  range	  of	  techniques	  and	  technologies	  that	  capture	  and	  use	  the	  autonomy	  of	  fish	  themselves.	  Consider	  current	  experiments	  on	  the	  use	  of	  lights	  in	  aquaculture	  pens	  to	  control	  behaviour.	  Some	  intensively	  farmed	  fish	  will	  exhibit	  fin	  damage	  as	  a	  result	  of	  inter-­‐fish	  aggression,	  and	  abrasion	  against	  surfaces;	   problems	   which	   may	   not	   occur	   in	   the	   wild.	   In	   some	   cases,	   this	   is	   a	  reflection	   of	   the	   relative	   ‘stocking	   densities’	   within	   aquaculture	   environments.102	  The	   problem	   is	   exacerbated	  where	   fish	   congregate	   and	   do	   not	   spread	   out	   evenly	  within	   the	   available	   space	   in	   sea	   cages,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   with	   salmon.	   Various	  researchers	   have	   experimented	   with	   using	   underwater	   lamps	   to	   influence	   the	  behaviour	   of	   salmon	   and	   prevent	   congregation,	   thus	   helping	   to	   mitigate	   the	  problems	   associated	   with	   high	   density.103	   These	   techniques	   work	   to	   shape	   the	  responsiveness	   of	   fish	   to	   the	   environment	   of	   the	   sea	   cage.	   The	   light	   techniques	  capture	  fish	  responses—such	  as	  aversion	  to	  bright	  light—and	  channel	  behaviours	  to	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  production	  techniques.	  Turn	  on	  a	  light,	  and	  some	  fish	  will	  run	   away:	   this	   technique	   thus	   uses	   fish	   resistance	   and	   autonomy	   to	   prevent	   fish	  congregating	   and	   to	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   meat	   produced.	   Creativity	   and	  resistance	  are	  channelled	  to	  create	  docile	  bodies	  out	  of	  resistant	  bodies;	  that	  is,	  they	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mould	   fish	   to	   use	   the	   production	   space	   in	   ways	   which	   do	   not	   compromise	   the	  quality	  of	  stock.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  intensive	  techniques	  use	  the	  bodily	  processes	  of	  the	  animal	  itself	  as	   a	  way	   to	   achieve	  production	   efficiency.	   Consider	  how	   farmed	   fish	   are	   routinely	  starved	   before	   transport	   and	   slaughter.104	   In	   some	   cases,	   farmed	   fish	   are	   denied	  food	   for	   several	   days	   or	   weeks.	   Fish	   are	   ‘ectothermic’	   and	   thus	   have	   metabolic	  efficiency	   in	   food	   consumption;	   many	   fish	   routinely	   survive	   in	   the	   wild	   for	   long	  periods	  without	  food.	  Aquaculture	  producers	  make	  use	  of	  this	  quality	  in	  starvation	  techniques;	  they	  take	  advantage	  of	  reduced	  metabolism,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  fish	  empty	  their	  guts	  and	  faeces,	  thus	  enabling	  a	  more	  desirable	  end	  product.105	  Of	  course,	  the	  welfare	   picture	   here	   is	   not	   straightforward.	   Some	   argue	   that	   the	   diminished	  metabolism	  induced	  by	  starvation	  is	  beneficial	  to	  welfare,	  for	  example,	  by	  reducing	  aggressive	   behaviours.106	   In	   these	   cases,	   however,	   we	   find	   again	   that	   the	   creative	  energies	   of	   fish,	   including	   their	   own	   resistance—at	   least	   at	   the	   level	   of	   a	   will	   to	  survive—is	  captured	  by	  the	  production	  process	  and	  harnessed	  towards	  the	  ends	  of	  production.	  Production	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  a	  process	  of	  interaction	  between	  humans	  and	  fish,	   of	   which	   innovation	   in	   relation	   to	   fish	   resistance	   drives	   innovation	   in	  production	  towards	  human	  ends.107	  	  
—CONCLUSION I	  would	   like	   to	  conclude	  with	  a	   few	  short	  observations	  on	   the	  conceptualisation	  of	  fish	  resistance	  and	  the	  potential	  it	  has	  for	  thinking	  about	  how	  we	  might	  intervene	  in	  systematic	   human	   violence	   against	   animals.	   Firstly,	   I	   stress	   that	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	  that	  we	  need	  to	  abandon	  a	  welfare	  approach	  to	  considering	  the	  treatment	  of	  fish.	  It	  is	  certainly	  worth	  noting	  that	  although	  progress	   in	   fish	  welfare	  has	  been	  relatively	  modest,	  at	   least	  relative	  to	   land	  animals	  that	  are	  used	  by	  humans,	   there	  have	  been	  some	  positive	  steps.108	  In	  principle,	  advocates	  for	  improving	  welfare	  for	  fish	  should	  support	   any	   reforms	   that	   reduce	   the	   suffering	   experienced	   by	   fish	   as	   part	   of	   the	  process	  of	  human	  utilisation.	  Questions	  around	  welfare	  will	  arguably	  become	  more	  vexing	  as	  consumption	  of	  fish	  sourced	  through	  aquaculture	  proportionally	  increases	  on	   a	   global	   scale.	   The	   inevitable	   growth	   of	   aquaculture	   industries	   will	   pose	   a	  mixture	   of	   opportunity	   and	   danger	   for	   animal	   advocacy.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  we	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   able	   to	   control	   and	   regulate	   for	   welfare	   outcomes	   for	   factory	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farmed	  fish	  than	  for	  wild	  commercial	  fishing,	  simply	  because	  the	  fish	  in	  aquaculture	  are	   subject	   to	   around-­‐the-­‐clock	   controls	   and	   there	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   enhanced	  management	  of	  pre-­‐slaughter	  and	  slaughter	  conditions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  with	  factory	  farmed	  land	  animals,	  I	  can	  only	  imagine	  that	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  see	  the	  intensity	  of	   our	   use	   of	   fish	   escalate,	  where	   economies	   of	   scale	  will	  work	   at	   cross	   purposes	  with	   welfare	   outcomes	   and	   new	   horrors	   are	   introduced	   as	   fish	   are	   exposed	   to	  intensive	  mechanised	  large-­‐scale	  production	  systems.	  	  It	  is	  for	  the	  latter	  reason	  that	  I	  think	  there	  is	  promise	  in	  exploring	  new	  ways	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  problem	  of	  human	  use	  of	  animals	  and	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  develop	  new	  framings.	  As	   I	  have	  argued,	   if	  we	  can	  understand	  fish	  as	  subject	   to	   large-­‐scale	  systems	   of	   violence,	   and	   understand	   fish	   as	   resistant	   to	   these	   same	   systems	   of	  violence,	   then	   this	   offers	   one	   way	   to	   imagine	   social	   justice	   for	   animals	   that	   goes	  beyond	  relief	  from	  suffering	  and	  towards	  relief	  from	  human-­‐imposed	  violence.	  This	  perspective	   asks	   us	   to	   imagine	   fish	   as	   not	   merely	   beings	   who	   might	   suffer,	   but	  beings	  who	  would	   prefer	   not	   to	   be	   used	   and	  would	   prefer	   not	   to	   die,	   beings	  who	  actively	  resist	  human	  attempts	  to	  bend	  them	  towards	  those	  ends.	  Adopting	  this	  sort	  of	   perspective	   offers	   opportunities	   to	   at	   least	   shift	   some	   of	   the	   language	   that	   is	  commonplace	   about	   fish	   and	   fisheries.	   For	   example,	   a	   different	   epistemological	  framing	   might	   allow	   us	   to	   be	   rid	   of	   the	   pernicious	   concept	   that	   fish	   are	   passive	  objects	   ‘harvested’	   from	  oceans	  and	  rivers.	  Further,	   the	   framing	  of	   fish	  as	  resistive	  animals	  might	  similarly	  be	  able	  to	  shift	  a	  public	  perception	  towards	  understanding	  technologies	   associated	   with	   fishing—the	   hook,	   the	   net,	   the	   fish	   farm—as	  instruments	   specifically	   designed	   to	   deliver	   violence	   (that	   is,	   ‘weapons’)	   upon	  creatures	  who	  would	   rather	  not	   receive	   this	  violence.	   Importantly,	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  fish	  suffer	  is	  not	  central	  to	  understanding	  whether	  fish	  resist.	  Whether	  fish	  feel	  pain	  might	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  weighing	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  violence	  we	   impose	  on	  sea	  animals	  as	  a	  social	   justice	   issue,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  alter	   the	  reality	  that	  violence	  is	  being	  imposed,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  creatures	  who	  resist	  this	  violence.	  	  Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  this	  is	  a	  more	  obscure	  point,	  acknowledging	  fish	  resistance	  inevitably	  involves	  rendering	  fish	  as	  co-­‐creators	  (often	  unwilling	  co-­‐creators)	  of	  the	  world	   we	   live	   in.	   Our	   systems	   of	   violence	   directed	   towards	   fish—the	   long	   food	  supply	   chains	   that	   link	   ocean	  or	   fish	   farm	   to	  dinner	  plate—owe	   something	   to	   fish	  resistance,	  since	  industries	  and	  economies	  have	  been	  created	  out	  of	  countering	  this	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resistance.	   This	   is	   both	   a	   sobering	   and	   empowering	   way	   to	   conceptualise	   the	  problem	   of	   fish	   resistance.	   It	   is	   sobering	   because	   so	   much	   potential	   creativity—human	  and	  non	  human—has	  been	  channelled	  into	  so	  much	  violence;	  this	  is	  violence	  that	  many	  animal	  advocates	  are	  increasingly	  arguing	  is	  unnecessary.	  It	  is,	  however,	  empowering	  to	  consider	  fish	  resistance	  in	  this	  way	  because	  understanding	  that	  fish	  might	  resist	  offers	  us	  a	  way	  to	  comprehend	  the	  immense	  contribution	  of	  non-­‐human	  political	   agency	   to	   the	   world	   that	   we	   see	   around	   us.	   Our	   world	   would	   be	  unrecognisable	   without	   all	   the	   animals	   that	   have	   been	   willing	   and	   unwilling	   co-­‐creators	   in	   our	   pasts;	   but	   this	   simultaneously	   offers	   us	   a	  way	   to	   think	   about	   how	  much	   our	   world	   would	   change	   if	   we	   cultivated	   a	   different	   relationship	   with	   the	  animals	   who	   will	   be	   in	   our	   future.	   In	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	   value	   of	   considering	  resistance	  and	  its	  usefulness	  for	  thinking	  about	  political	  structure	  and	  change,	  Hardt	  and	  Negri	  state:	  Now,	   it	   is	   perfectly	   reasonably	   to	   ask	   if	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   true	   that	   resistance	  comes	   before	   power	   and	   that	   social	   struggle	   precede	   and	   prefigure	  capitalist	  restructuration.	  We	  have	  not	  offered	  an	  argument	  for	  it,	  really—precisely,	  we	  have	   treated	   it	   as	   an	  axiom.	  Our	  book	   tries	   to	  demonstrate	  that	   it	   is	  plausible	  to	  read	  the	  history	   from	  below,	  but	  that	   is	  really	  not	  a	  proof.	  What	  is	  more	  interesting,	  though,	  is	  the	  political	  effect	  of	  this	  axiom,	  that	  it	  highlights	  the	  power	  of	  resistance	  and	  the	  power	  of	  social	  struggles	  ...	   Today,	   when	   facing	   the	   forces	   of	   capitalist	   globalisation	   and	   our	   new	  world	  order,	  it	  is	  all	  too	  easy	  and	  all	  too	  common	  to	  feel	  ourselves	  and	  our	  social	  movements	  powerless.	  This	  method	  can	  work	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  antidote	  to	   that	   cynicism	   and	   sense	   of	   powerlessness.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	  pretending	  that	  we	  are	  powerful	  when	  we	  are	  not,	  but	  rather	  recognising	  the	  power	  we	  really	  have;	  the	  power	  that	  created	  the	  contemporary	  world	  and	  can	  create	  another.109	  Fish	   create	   worlds	   we	   cannot	   even	   understand;	   they	   defy	   our	   imagination.	   Our	  primary	   relationship	   with	   fish,	   at	   least	   so	   far,	   has	   been	   violent	   and	   parasitic.	  We	  have	   quite	   literally	   fed	   off	   their	   creativity	   for	   our	   own	   benefit.	   Recognising	   fish	  resistance	  might	  give	  us	  different	  ways	   to	   think	  about	  how	  we	  might	  relate	   to	   fish	  beyond	  simply	  finding	  new	  ways	  to	  counter	  their	  resistance	  to	  us.	  What	  would	  our	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world	   look	   like	   if	  we	  worked	  with	  and	  supported	  the	  creativity	  of	   fish,	  rather	  than	  simply	  working	  against	  it?	  	   —	  	  Dinesh	   Joseph	   Wadiwel	   is	   a	   lecturer	   in	   social	   justice	   and	   human	   rights	   at	   the	  University	   of	   Sydney.	  His	   research	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   sovereignty	   and	   the	  nature	   of	  rights,	  violence,	  race	  and	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  animal	  studies.	  His	  most	  recent	  monograph	  is	  The	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  Animals	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  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  Volume	  1:	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge,	  Penguin	  Books,	  London	  1998,	  p.	  93.	  Note	  resonances	  with	  Max	  Weber’s	  definition:	  ‘“Power”	  (Macht)	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  one	  actor	  within	  a	  social	  relationship	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  own	  will	  despite	  resistance,	  regardless	  of	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  this	  probability	  rests.’	  See	  M.	  Weber,	  Economy	  and	  Society:	  An	  Outline	  
of	  Interpretive	  Sociology	  Volume	  1,	  Bedminister	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1968,	  p.	  53.	  The	  difference	  between	  this	  conception	  of	  power	  and	  that	  of	  Foucault	  is	  that	  in	  the	  latter	  model	  the	  ‘will’	  of	  an	  individual	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  production	  of	  power.	  Our	  own	  ‘will’	  is	  itself	  a	  product	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  power	  that	  we	  are	  caught	  in—effects	  of	  power	  are	  rarely	  the	  product	  of	  intention.	  I	  note	  further	  that	  Foucault	  notoriously	  amends	  his	  view	  of	  resistance,	  or	  at	  least	  offers	  different	  perspectives	  on	  resistance,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  later	  work.	  It	  would	  be	  incorrect	  to	  say	  that	  resistance	  does	  not	  matter	  in	  his	  late	  work;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  we	  find	  the	  problem	  of	  resistance	  revisited	  in	  different	  forms.	  For	  example,	  Foucault	  has	  a	  lengthy	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘counter-­‐conduct’	  a	  mode	  of	  resistance	  against	  governmental	  regimes,	  in	  his	  1977–78	  lectures.	  See	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Security,	  Territory,	  
Population:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  France,	  1977–78,	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  London,	  2007,	  pp.	  194–5.	  Foucault’s	  late	  lectures	  contain	  a	  useful	  summary	  of	  his	  own	  methodological	  trajectory.	  See,	  particularly,	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Government	  of	  Self	  and	  Others:	  Lectures	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  France	  1982–
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1983,	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  New	  York,	  2010,	  pp.	  4–6;	  and	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Courage	  of	  Truth:	  
Lectures	  at	  the	  Collège	  de	  France	  1983–1984,	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  New	  York,	  2011,	  pp.	  8–9.	  32	  Foucault,	  The	  Will	  to	  Knowledge,	  p.	  96.	  	  33	  See	  Dinesh	  Joseph	  Wadiwel,	  ‘Lubricative	  Power’,	  Theory	  and	  Event,	  vol.	  12,	  no.	  4,	  2009.	  doi:	  10.1353/tae.0.0090.	  34	  See	  Black,	  pp.	  245–6.	  35	  In	  this	  essay	  I	  explicitly	  build	  on	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  epistemic	  violence	  and	  resistance	  that	  I	  offer	  in	  my	  book,	  The	  War	  against	  Animals.	  	  36	  See	  Foucault’s	  famous	  closing	  paragraphs	  in	  The	  Order	  of	  Things.	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  Order	  of	  
Things:	  An	  Archeology	  of	  the	  Human	  Sciences,	  Vintage	  Books,	  New	  York,	  1994,	  pp.	  386–7.	  	  37	  Ibid.,	  p.	  xxii.	  	  38	  Rose,	  Arlinghaus,	  Cooke,	  Diggles,	  Sawynok,	  Stevens	  and	  Wynne,	  p.	  123.	  39	  Rose	  et	  al.	  state:	  	  A	  justification	  for	  restrictive	  welfare	  policies	  is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  “benefit	  of	  the	  doubt”	  dogma.	  This	  brand	  of	  logic	  peculiar	  to	  welfare	  biology	  is,	  in	  effect,	  an	  admission	  that	  the	  fish	  pain	  issue	  is	  not	  resolved	  (hence	  the	  doubt),	  but	  the	  consequence	  is	  to	  mandate	  policy	  as	  if	  the	  matter	  actually	  was	  resolved	  in	  favour	  of	  fish	  pain	  interpretations.	  This	  is	  a	  social-­‐political	  manoeuvre	  that	  effectively	  exempts	  valid	  science	  from	  policy.	  	  Rose,	  Arlinghaus,	  Cooke,	  Diggles,	  Sawynok,	  Stevens	  and	  Wynne,	  pp.	  123–4.	  	  40	  I	  note	  the	  latter	  question	  is	  not	  scientific	  in	  nature,	  but	  rather	  ethical	  and	  political,	  but	  it	  equally	  relates	  to	  how	  we	  understand	  and	  respond	  to	  truth.	  I	  am	  deliberately	  playing	  with	  Jeremy	  Bentham	  here,	  and	  his	  famous	  footnote,	  which	  proved	  influential	  for	  pro-­‐animal	  discourse,	  at	  least	  in	  Peter	  Singer’s	  foundational	  text	  Animal	  Liberation.	  See	  Jeremy	  Bentham,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  
Morals	  and	  Legislation,	  Chapter	  XIX,	  Note	  §.	  From	  my	  perspective,	  and	  against	  Benthem’s,	  the	  question	  should	  neither	  be	  can	  they	  think,	  can	  they	  reason	  nor	  can	  they	  suffer,	  but	  instead,	  ‘why	  it	  is	  that	  we	  can	  justify	  using	  animals	  in	  the	  way	  we	  do	  when	  there	  is	  the	  possibility,	  every	  possibility,	  that	  they	  think,	  reason	  and	  suffer	  as	  we	  do?’	  41	  On	  this	  politics,	  see	  Wendy	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Princeton,	  1995;	  and	  Wendy	  Brown,	  ‘Suffering	  Rights	  as	  Paradoxes,’	  Constellations.	  7.2,	  2000,	  pp.	  230-­‐241.	  doi:	  10.1111/1467-­‐8675.00183.	  42	  This	  should	  not	  seem	  strange	  to	  those	  who	  have	  engaged	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  social	  justice	  struggles.	  Feminists	  have,	  for	  example,	  fought	  for	  decades	  to	  have	  domestic	  and	  sexual	  violence	  recognised	  in	  domestic	  and	  international	  law	  as	  violence	  worthy	  of	  legal	  attention.	  This	  is	  an	  epistemic	  problem,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  law,	  and	  by	  extension,	  patriarchy,	  have	  systematically	  failed	  to	  see	  acts	  of	  domestic	  and	  sexual	  violence	  as	  constituting	  violence,	  have	  failed	  to	  recognise	  perpetrators	  as	  wielding	  violence	  (so,	  for	  example,	  men	  are	  configured	  as	  unlucky,	  or	  unwitting,	  or	  victims	  themselves)	  and	  finally	  have	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  situated	  women	  as	  not	  having	  a	  subjecthood	  that	  can	  be	  violated,	  or	  are	  open	  to	  violation	  without	  protection	  of	  the	  law	  under	  particular	  circumstances	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  home).	  43	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak,	  ‘Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?’,	  in	  C.	  Nelson	  and	  L.	  Grossberg	  (eds),	  Marxism	  
and	  the	  Interpretation	  of	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  Macmillan	  Education,	  Basingstoke,	  1988,	  pp.	  271–313.	  	  44	  On	  the	  international	  gender	  politics	  of	  ‘customary	  practice’,	  see	  Dicle	  Kogacioglu,	  ‘The	  Tradition	  Effect:	  Framing	  Honor	  Crimes	  in	  Turkey’,	  differences:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Feminist	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  Studies,	  vol.	  15,	  no.	  2,	  2004,	  pp.	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  doi:	  10.1215/10407391-­‐15-­‐2-­‐118.	  45	  Spivak,	  p.	  93.	  	  46	  Brown,	  p.	  231.	  	  47	  See	  for	  example	  Gary	  Francione’s	  critique	  of	  animal	  welfare:	  Gary	  L.	  Francione,	  Animals,	  Property	  and	  
the	  Law,	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  Philadelphia,	  2007.	  See	  also	  Donaldson	  and	  Kymlicka,	  p.	  2	  and	  Peter	  Sankoff,	  ‘The	  Welfare	  Paradigm:	  Making	  the	  World	  a	  Better	  Place	  for	  Animals?’,	  in	  Peter	  Sankoff	  and	  Steven	  White	  (eds),	  Animal	  Law	  in	  Australasia:	  A	  New	  Dialogue,	  The	  Federation	  Press,	  Sydney,	  2009.	  48	  Deirdre	  Bourke,	  ‘The	  Use	  and	  Misuse	  of	  “Rights	  Talk”	  by	  the	  Animal	  Rights	  Movement’,	  in	  Peter	  Sankoff	  and	  Steven	  White	  (eds),	  Animal	  Law	  in	  Australasia:	  A	  New	  Dialogue,	  The	  Federation	  Press,	  Sydney,	  2009,	  p.	  133.	  49	  See,	  for	  example,	  Adam	  Shriver,	  ‘Knocking	  Out	  Pain	  in	  Livestock:	  Can	  Technology	  Succeed	  Where	  Morality	  has	  Stalled?’,	  Neuroethics,	  vol.	  2,	  no.	  3,	  2009,	  pp.	  115–24.	  doi:	  10.1007/s12152-­‐009-­‐9048-­‐6.	  See	  also	  Richard	  Twine,	  Animals	  as	  Biotechnology:	  Ethics,	  Sustainability	  and	  Critical	  Animal	  Studies,	  Routledge/Earthscan,	  London,	  2010.	  	  50	  One	  example	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  argument	  is	  Christie	  Wilcox,	  ‘Bambi	  or	  Bessie:	  Are	  Wild	  Animals	  Happier?’,	  Scientific	  American,	  12	  April	  2011	  at	  <http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-­‐blog/2011/04/12/bambi-­‐or-­‐bessie-­‐are-­‐wild-­‐animals-­‐happier/>.	  Note	  that	  Bentham’s	  famous	  footnote	  on	  animals	  more	  or	  less	  contained	  the	  same	  assertion:	  	  If	  the	  being	  eaten	  were	  all,	  there	  is	  very	  good	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  be	  suffered	  to	  eat	  such	  of	  them	  as	  we	  like	  to	  eat:	  we	  are	  the	  better	  for	  it,	  and	  they	  are	  never	  the	  worse.	  They	  have	  none	  of	  those	  long-­‐protracted	  anticipations	  of	  future	  misery	  which	  we	  have.	  The	  death	  they	  suffer	  in	  our	  hands	  commonly	  is,	  and	  always	  may	  be,	  a	  speedier,	  and	  by	  that	  means	  a	  less	  painful	  one,	  than	  that	  which	  would	  await	  them	  in	  the	  inevitable	  course	  of	  nature.	  If	  the	  being	  killed	  were	  all,	  there	  is	  very	  good	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  be	  suffered	  to	  kill	  such	  as	  molest	  us:	  we	  should	  be	  the	  worse	  for	  their	  living,	  and	  they	  are	  never	  the	  worse	  for	  being	  dead.	  But	  is	  there	  any	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  be	  suffered	  to	  torment	  them?	  See	  Jeremy	  Bentham,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Morals	  and	  Legislation,	  Library	  of	  Economics	  and	  Liberty,	  23	  March	  2016,	  <http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html>,	  Chapter	  XVII,	  n122.	  A	  variation	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  view	  that	  vegetarian	  diets	  lead	  to	  more	  death:	  ‘relying	  on	  grains	  and	  pulses	  brings	  destruction	  of	  native	  ecosystems,	  significant	  threats	  to	  native	  species	  and	  at	  least	  25	  times	  more	  deaths	  of	  sentient	  animals	  per	  kilogram	  of	  food’.	  See	  Mike	  Archer,	  ‘Ordering	  the	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  Vegetarian	  Meal?	  There	  is	  More	  Blood	  on	  Your	  Hands’,	  The	  Conversation,	  16	  December	  2011,	  <http://theconversation.com/ordering-­‐the-­‐vegetarian-­‐meal-­‐theres-­‐more-­‐animal-­‐blood-­‐on-­‐your-­‐hands-­‐4659>.	  	  51	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘balanced	  harvest’	  to	  effectively	  describe	  targeted	  killing	  of	  fish	  species	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  adequate	  population	  numbers	  to	  ensure	  reproductive	  viability	  and	  future	  sustainability.	  See	  United	  Nations	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization,	  The	  State	  of	  World	  
Fisheries	  and	  Aquaculture,	  pp.	  136–41.	  	  52	  A	  prominent	  critique	  of	  making	  this	  assumption	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  a	  ‘sentimental	  anthropomorphism’.	  We	  see	  elements	  of	  this	  critique	  advanced	  in	  Elspeth	  Probyn’s	  recent	  work	  on	  fishing,	  which	  in	  its	  care	  to	  not	  employ	  anthropocentric	  views	  on	  what	  fish	  may	  want,	  fails	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  welfare	  issues	  that	  might	  attend	  the	  use	  of	  fish	  for	  food,	  and	  the	  violence	  of	  this	  use.	  Probyn	  states:	  	  In	  terms	  of	  our	  own	  areas	  of	  study,	  the	  complex	  and	  vexed	  questions	  of	  eating	  and	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  relations	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  which	  species	  is	  most	  anthropomorphically	  endowed.	  If	  we	  are	  truly	  to	  advance	  a	  program	  of	  research,	  and	  of	  ethics,	  in	  eating	  we	  need	  to	  attend	  to	  both	  the	  singularity	  of	  species	  as	  well	  as	  our	  mutuality.	  This	  is	  a	  tough	  call,	  but	  necessary	  if	  we	  are	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  what	  makes	  for	  emotional	  geographies	  and	  for	  whom.	  As	  researchers	  we	  are	  compelled	  to	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  faceted	  aspects	  of	  life,	  recognizing	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  what	  makes	  things	  feel.	  We	  may	  not	  like	  that	  the	  tuna	  men	  are	  businessmen,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  complex	  people	  with	  ties	  to	  places,	  fish,	  families,	  and	  communities	  and	  of	  course	  the	  sea.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  what	  tuna	  feel,	  and	  to	  speculate	  on	  that	  risks	  drawing	  us	  into	  the	  false	  security	  of	  sentimental	  comfort.	  	  Elspeth	  Probyn,	  ‘Swimming	  with	  Tuna:	  Human-­‐Ocean	  Entanglements’,	  Australian	  Humanities	  Review,	  no.	  51,	  2011,	  pp.	  97–114.	  Probyn	  is	  attempting	  to	  avoid	  a	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  violence	  that	  arises	  from	  sentimentality;	  however,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  ‘sentimental	  comfort’	  in	  assuming	  that	  ‘the	  fish	  actually	  wanted	  to	  die’.	  This	  is	  surely	  a	  central	  and	  comfortable	  assumption	  that	  allows	  mainstay	  violent	  practices	  against	  animals	  to	  continue.	  	  53	  See	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  doi:	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  Books,	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  doi:	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  trout	  fishing	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  pp.	  339–58.	  61	  Palmer,	  ‘Taming	  the	  Wild	  Profusion	  of	  Existing	  Things?’,	  p.	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  Essays	  on	  Livelihood,	  Dwelling	  and	  Skill,	  Routledge,	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  64	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  summary	  of	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  operaist	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  see	  Sandro	  Mezzadra,	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  and	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  Immanuel	  Ness	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  Critique	  of	  Political	  Zoology	  Conference,	  Hamburg,	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  und	  Fliehen,	  Aneignen,	  Stören	  und	  Besetzen’,	  Eurozine,	  May	  2013,	  <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-­‐05-­‐07-­‐amir-­‐de.html	  >.	  The	  final	  lines	  read:	  ‘Wo	  es	  Stadt	  gibt,	  da	  gibt	  es	  auch	  Stadttauben.	  Und	  wo	  es	  Stadttauben	  gibt,	  da	  gibt	  es	  auch	  Widerstand’	  (Where	  there	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  183–200.	  65	  See	  Noske’s	  discussion	  of	  human	  domestication	  as	  a	  case	  of	  social	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  also	  Michel	  Serres,	  
The	  Parasite,	  John	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  Baltimore,	  1982.	  	  66	  I	  refer	  here	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